Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

2012

Three essays on the efficiency of rural hospitals in the United
States
Iustin Cristian Nedelea
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Nedelea, Iustin Cristian, "Three essays on the efficiency of rural hospitals in the United States" (2012). LSU
Doctoral Dissertations. 3482.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/3482

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu.

THREE ESSAYS ON THE EFFICIENCY OF RURAL HOSPITALS IN
THE UNITED STATES

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness

by
Iustin Cristian Nedelea
B.A., University of Bucharest, 1997
M.S., Louisiana State University, 2007
December 2012

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my gratitude and sincere appreciation for those who have helped
me to successfully complete my doctorate degree in Agricultural Economics at Louisiana State
University. First of all, I would like to thank my major professor, Dr. James Matthew Fannin,
for his support, valuable advice, and guidance at all stages of my doctorate program. I thank Dr.
Fannin for always trusting me and encouraging me to do my best. I would like to thank to my
dissertation committee members, Dr. Richard Kazmierczak, Dr. Lynn Kennedy, Dr. Jeffrey
Gillespie, and Dr. Munechica Katayama for their advice and helpful comments related with my
dissertation research. I thank Dr. Kazmierczak for his help and advice during my graduate
program. I thank Dr. Gillespie and Charles Roussel for their generous advice that helped me in
my teaching undergraduate courses. I also thank Dr. Gail Cramer, department head, for giving
me the opportunity to independently teach two courses in agricultural economics.
I would also like to thank my friends and colleagues Jeremy, Tyler, Paul, and Drew for
making the time spent in office enjoyable. For Julie and Shawn Foreman, I would like to thank
them for being such great friends and for making our stay in Louisiana a wonderful experience.
I wish to give my special thanks, and to dedicate this dissertation, to my wife Elisabeta,
and our son, Gabriel, for their love, support, and patience throughout my Ph.D. program. For my
family in Romania, I thank them for their patience and love. Nothing that I have accomplished
would have been possible without the love and support of my family.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……..…………………………………………………………...

ii

ABSTRACT …………………………………………………………………………………

v

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………....
1.1 Introduction and Background Information…….…………………….......................
1.2 Framing the Policy Question ……………................................................................
1.3 Study Objectives ……………………………...........................................................
1.4 Contributions to Literature.………………………………………………………..
1.5 Outline …………………………………………………………………………......
1.6 References …………………………………………………………………………

1
1
5
6
7
8
11

CHAPTER 2. IMPACT OF CONVERSION TO CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITAL
STATUS ON HOSPITAL EFFICIENCY ……………………………………………….....
2.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………...................
2.2 CAH Program ……………………………………………………………………...
2.3 Literature Review …………………………………………………………………..
2.4 Methodology ……………………………………………………………………….
2.4.1 Analysis of Efficiency Distributions …………………………………………
2.4.2 Second Stage Truncated Regression …………………………………………
2.5 Data ………………………………………………………………………………...
2.6 Results and Discussion …………………………………………………………….
2.6.1 Analysis of Inefficiency Distributions ……………………………………….
2.6.2 Bootstrapped Truncated Regressions ………………………………………..
2.6.3 Discussion ……………………………………………………………………
2.7 Conclusions ………………………………………………………………………...
2.8 References ………………………………………………………………………….

13
13
16
17
18
20
22
24
28
30
31
38
39
40

CHAPTER 3. COST EFFICIENCY OF RURAL HOSPITALS: DEA, TWO-STAGE
APPROACH AND STOCHASTIC FRONTIER ANALYSIS ……………………………..
3.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………..
3.2 Methods ………………………………………………………................................
3.2.1 DEA Cost Efficiency Estimator ……………………………………………..
3.2.2 Density Analysis of DEA Efficiency Scores ………………………………...
3.2.3 Two-Stage, Semi-parametric Approach ……………………………………..
3.2.4 Stochastic Frontier Analysis …………………………………………………
3.3 Data ………………………………………………………………………………..
3.4 Results ……………………………………………………………………………...
3.4.1 Density Analysis of DEA Cost Inefficiency Scores …………………………
3.4.2 Marginal Effects of Environmental Variables ……………………………….
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions ………………………………………………….........
3.6 References ………………………………………………………………………….

43
43
45
45
46
46
48
49
55
56
57
60
64

iii

CHAPTER 4. TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY OF CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITALS: AN
APPLICATION OF THE TWO-STAGE APPROACH WITH DOUBLE BOOTSTRAP ...
4.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………...
4.2 Literature Review …………………………………………………………………..
4.3 Data …………………………………………………………………………….......
4.3.1 DEA Variables ……………………………………………………………….
4.3.2 Environmental Variables …………………………………………………….
4.4 Methodology ………....…………………………………………………………….
4.4.1 DEA Efficiency Estimator (First Stage) ……………………………………..
4.4.2 Truncated Regression (Second Stage) ……………………………………….
4.5 Results ……………………………………………………………………………...
4.5.1 Technical Efficiency Scores (First Stage) ……………………………………
4.5.2 Truncated Regression Results (Second Stage) ………………………………
4.6 Conclusions ………………………………………………………………………...
4.7 References ………………………………………………………………………….

66
66
69
70
70
71
74
74
76
78
78
80
83
84

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS ………………………………………………………………
5.1 Summary and Conclusions ………………………………………………………...
5.2 Policy Implications ………………………………………………………………...
5.3 Limitations and Future Research …………………………………………………..
5.4 References ………………………………………………………………………….

87
87
90
92
93

APPENDIX 1. ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 2 ………………………………

94

APPENDIX 2. ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 3 …...………….........................

99

APPENDIX 3. ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 4 .……...……………………… 101
APPENDIX 4. AUTHORIZATIONS FROM PUBLISHERS …………………..…………… 103
VITA ………………………………………………………………………………………….

iv

108

ABSTRACT
The Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Program was created in response to the dramatic
deterioration of financial conditions and the potential threat of closure of small rural hospitals
under the Prospective Payment System (PPS). CAHs receive cost-based reimbursement for
services provided to Medicare patients in exchange for accepting a number of restrictions. In the
first essay, I examine the impact of conversion to CAH status on hospital efficiency. The
estimated results show that CAHs are less cost and allocatively efficient than non-converting,
PPS rural hospitals, without being less technically efficient. Relative to their pre-conversion
selves, CAHs appear to be slightly less allocatively efficient, while they are slightly more
technically efficient, and no less cost efficient. The second essay examines cost efficiency
differences between CAHs and non-converting, PPS rural hospitals using quality controls and
alternative methods of efficiency analysis. The results show that CAHs are, on average, less cost
efficient than non-converting, PPS rural hospitals. The third essay estimates the marginal effects
of environmental variables on the technical efficiency of CAHs. The results suggest that
enhanced Medicare reimbursement may not have had a detrimental effect on the technical
efficiency of CAHs. Overall, the results of this dissertation have important policy implications.
First, they show that cost-based reimbursed CAHs are, on average, between 4.5 and 6.7
percentage points less cost efficient than non-converting, PPS rural hospitals. This can be
translated in a cost per CAH between $751,000 and $1.12 million (in 2005 dollars) higher than
the cost that would have been under the PPS. Second, the results show that the technical
efficiency of CAHs improved relative to the pre-conversion period and that CAHs are as
technically efficient as non-converting, PPS rural hospitals. Third, improved technical efficiency
of CAHs in conjunction with their decreased cost efficiency suggest that reductions in CAHs’
v

cost efficiency may not be a function of direct overconsumption of physical inputs. Rather,
decreased cost efficiency of CAHs may be driven by allocative inefficiency generated by the
inability of these hospitals to substitute to lower input cost combinations in the production
process.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction and Background Information
Rural hospitals in the U.S. have plaid a critical role in the delivery of health care services in rural
communities. Their major goal has been to increase health care access for individuals living in
rural areas [1]. However, due to their relatively small size, rural hospitals have been vulnerable
to policy changes. Medicare has been the most important source of revenue for rural hospitals
because rural communities have a disproportionately larger proportion of the elderly than their
urban hospital counterparts [2]. Relying heavily on Medicare, small rural hospitals have been
largely affected by the Medicare reimbursement policies. The increased dependence on
Medicare has been even more significant starting with the Social Security Amendments of 1983
when Medicare replaced the retrospective cost-based reimbursement with the Prospective
Payment System (PPS). While under the cost-based reimbursement hospitals are reimbursed
total allowable costs for providing services to Medicare beneficiaries, the PPS system pays a
fixed fee per case depending on the diagnosis-related group (DRG). The PPS system has been
designed to promote efficiency in hospital operations by encouraging the use of outpatient
services, instead of inpatient care, and reduced length of stay [3].
Rural hospitals (especially small ones) were particularly vulnerable to the financial
pressures resulting from the PPS reimbursement [3]. Under the PPS, Medicare paid rural
hospitals at a lower rate than their urban counterparts for the same services because of the lower
labor costs in rural areas. This, combined with a general decline in non-Medicare admissions
and occupancy rates and with increased dependence of rural hospitals on Medicare
reimbursement, undermined the general financial viability of rural hospitals in the 1980s and
1

1990s. One consequence of this financial stress was an increase in the closure of rural hospitals.
In response to the financial problems of small rural hospitals, Congress created special Medicare
payment policies.
One of the most important changes in rural health care policy that has impacted rural
hospitals dramatically has been the creation of Critical Access Hospital (CAH) program which
was introduced by the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997. A hospital that converts to CAH
status has the advantage of receiving Medicare cost-based reimbursement for inpatient and
outpatient services, post-acute (swing-bed) care, and laboratory services delivered to Medicare
beneficiaries. Under the BBA of 1997, however, a rural hospital had to meet several
requirements before being considered eligible for CAH designation. Most importantly, to
qualify for CAH status a hospital needed to be classified as non-metropolitan, be under
government or non-profit ownership, be located at least 15 miles by secondary road or 35 miles
by primary road from the nearest short-term general hospital, or be declared by the state as a
“necessary provider”. Under the “necessary provider” provision, states could waive the distance
requirement for hospitals that were considered important for the delivery of health care services
and qualify them for CAH conversion. Many hospitals failed to meet the 35-mile criterion for
being considered isolated hospitals and entered the program based on state criteria that declared
them necessary providers. Hospitals that converted to CAH status were also required to use no
more than 15 acute care beds at any one time plus an additional of 10 beds to be used only as
swing beds for long-term care patients, limit the length of stay to 96 hours or less for acute care
patients, and provide 24-hour emergency care services.
The Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) of 1999 subsequently expanded CAH
eligibility by allowing for-profit hospitals to participate, and by including facilities that were

2

located in counties contained in Metropolitan Statistical Areas but identified as rural by their
own state regulations. The BBRA also replaced the 96-hour length of stay limit with the less
restrictive requirement that the annual average length of stay could not be greater than four days.
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)
eliminated states’ ability to declare a hospital as a “necessary provider” starting in January 2006
and states could no longer waive the distance requirement. As a result, few additional hospitals
met the criteria and entered the CAH program after January 2006. In addition, MMA increased
the reimbursement for CAHs to 101 percent of reasonable costs for inpatient, outpatient and
post-acute care, the number of acute care beds increased from 15 to 25, and allowed CAHs to
have PPS reimbursed skilled nursing facilities, psychiatric units, rehabilitation units, and home
health agencies.
Since 1999, the CAH program has grown rapidly from 41 hospitals in 1999 to 1,055
hospitals in 2005 and to 1,327 CAHs in 2011. A large number of hospitals converted to CAH
status between 2001 and 2005, with the largest number of hospitals joining to CAH program in
2005 because of the intention of the federal government to stop allowing states to waive the
distance requirement with “necessary provider” criteria [4]. Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission (MedPAC) [5] estimated that, due to flexibility in the “necessary provider” criteria,
only 17 percent of CAHs are more than 35 road miles from another provider, 67 percent are 15
to 35 miles, and 16 percent of CAHs are less than 15 miles from another hospital.
The CAH program has been created to preserve access to primary and emergency care
services in isolated rural areas by improving the financial conditions of small rural hospitals and
preventing closure. Rural hospitals that converted to CAH status have generally experienced
significant improvements in their finances due to Medicare cost-based reimbursement. MedPAC
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[5] estimated hospitals that converted to CAH status have dramatically increased their Medicare
payments and improved their all-payer profit margins from -1.2 percent in 1998 to 2.2 percent in
2003. For similar rural hospitals that did not convert to CAH status and remained on PPS allpayer profit margins declined from 2.2 percent in 1998 to -0.2 percent in 2003. Additionally,
Medicare payments to CAHs rose, on average, by 9.5 percent per year during the period 19982003, compared with a 3.3 percent rise for similar rural hospitals that did not convert to CAH
status.
Medicare cost-based payments for CAH hospitals were over $3 million per hospital in
2003, roughly $850,000 more per hospital than if CAHs would have received PPS payment rates.
MedPAC [5] estimated that the $850,000 represented increased Medicare payment rates rather
than volume increases. The increase in the volume of outpatient services and post-acute (swingbed) days at CAHs was roughly offset by the decrease in inpatient volume. MedPAC [5] also
predicted that, in 2006, Medicare payments per CAH were roughly $1 million higher under costbased reimbursement than they would have been under PPS rates. Recent data from MedPAC
indicate that payments for CAHs are roughly $2 billion higher than they would have been under
PPS. While part of this increase in Medicare spending can be explained by improvements in
quality and access since quality and access improvements have been the goals of the CAH
program [6], part of it might represent inefficiency.
The PPS system has been designed to promote efficiency in hospital operations by
motivating hospitals to keep their costs below the PPS reimbursement rates [7]. Under the PPS
system, hospitals are allowed to keep the difference between the PPS rate and actual cost of
providing services. Conversely, hospitals can lose money if their costs exceed the PPS rates.
Cost-based reimbursement, on the other hand, has been historically associated with inefficiency
4

in hospital operations. The rationale is that under cost-based reimbursement a hospital has an
incentive to oversupply services (and increase costs) in order to receive higher revenues because
Medicare pays on a cost basis [8-9]. Since CAH hospitals receive Medicare cost-based
reimbursement, there have been concerns that they will have a disincentive to control costs and
operate efficiently. In the 2005 Report to Congress, the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission states: “Although the CAH program has helped preserve access to emergency and
inpatient care in isolated areas, it may not have accomplished this goal in an efficient manner.”
1.2 Framing the Policy Question
One of the most important challenges regarding rural health care policy changes is to determine
whether the benefits outweigh the costs. The CAH program has been designed to protect small,
financially vulnerable rural hospitals that might be essential for access to health care services by
granting them Medicare cost-based reimbursement, rather than prospective payments [10]. The
benefits of the CAH program have been mostly associated with improvements in access to health
care services in isolated rural areas. Previous research has shown that an increase in travel time
both discourages the demand for health care and reduces the probability of seeking health care
[11]. Because CAHs decrease the travel time by maintaining hospital services in isolated areas,
it is expected that the demand for health care services (and, consequently, health status) will
increase in rural areas [12]. In addition, retaining a limited hospital facility in a rural community
not only reduces welfare losses relative to the hospital closure [13], but also has a positive
economic impact on the community as a whole [14].
The cost of the CAH program is represented by increased Medicare payments for CAH
hospitals which are borne in principal by taxpayers. As previously mentioned, MedPAC [5]
estimated that in 2003 payments per CAH were roughly $850,000 higher under cost-based
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reimbursement than they would have been under the PPS system. The total costs of the CAH
program under Medicare cost-based reimbursement may consist of two parts: costs associated
with optimal use of resources in health care production and costs associated with inefficiency.
While a complete evaluation of the CAH program requires answering the question whether the
total benefits outweigh the total costs, I focus in this research on assessing the efficiency /
inefficiency of CAH hospitals. The question I seek to answer in this research is: does the CAH
program have created a disincentive for the efficient operation of hospitals that converted to
CAH status? Alternatively, does enhanced Medicare reimbursement have a negative effect on the
efficiency of CAHs?
1.3 Study Objectives
Cost containment in the health care industry is one of the issues at the forefront of the present
health care debate. With health care costs rising at a rapid rate, an analysis of the efficiency of
CAH program is important as Congress weighs the tradeoff of increased Medicare costs versus
rural health care access.
The primary objective of this research is to analyze the impact of the CAH program on
hospital efficiency. Specific objectives are:
1. Analyze the impact of conversion to CAH status on hospital efficiency by comparing
the cost, technical, and allocative efficiencies of a sample of rural hospitals before
and after the conversion to CAH status as well as by comparing the efficiency of
CAHs with that of a group of non-converting, PPS rural hospitals.
2. Examine cost efficiency differences between CAHs and non-converting, PPS rural
hospitals using quality controls and alternative methods of efficiency analysis.
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3. Estimate the (marginal) effects of environmental variables (especially of Medicare
and Medicaid financing) on the technical efficiency of CAH hospitals.
1.4 Contributions to Literature
Previous research focused almost exclusively on evaluating financial performance and quality of
care of CAH hospitals. Using a panel data set of 89 rural hospitals in Iowa, Li et al. [15] found
that hospitals that converted to CAH status significantly increased their operating revenues,
expenses, and margins. MedPAC [5] estimated hospitals that converted to CAH status have
dramatically increased their Medicare payments and improved their all-payer profit margins
between 1998 and 2003. Li et al. [16] examined the impact of CAH conversion on hospital
patient safety and found that CAH conversion was associated with improved performance of
certain Patient Safety Indicators. In a recent study, Rosko and Mutter [17] compared the cost
inefficiency of CAHs with that of prospectively paid rural hospitals using stochastic frontier
analysis and found that CAHs were, on average, less cost efficient than PPS rural hospitals.1
The overall contribution of this study to the literature is twofold. The first is treating
efficiency as a metric that should be considered in the policy analysis of the CAH program that
has a focus on access and quality. The second is the application of improved techniques to
hospital efficiency analysis. Specifically, a nonparametric kernel density estimator is used to
estimate and visualize the efficiency distributions of a sample of hospitals before and after the
conversion to CAH status as well as of a comparison group of non-converting, prospectively
paid rural hospitals. The null hypotheses on equality between these efficiency distributions are
tested using a bootstrap-based test proposed by Simar and Zelenyuk [18]. Further, a two-stage,
semi-parametric approach with the single and double bootstrap procedures proposed by Simar
1

No published articles on the efficiency of CAHs existed when I started this research.
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and Wilson [19] is used for making valid inferences about the impact of environmental variables
on hospital efficiency.
1.5 Outline
In Chapter 2, the impact of conversion to CAH status on hospital efficiency is examined
(Objective 1) using a two-stage approach and recent methodological advancements of Simar and
Zelenyuk [18] and Simar and Wilson [19]. In the first stage, data envelopment analysis (DEA) is
used to estimate cost, technical, and allocative efficiency scores of each hospital in the sample. I
estimate and compare the densities of efficiency scores of CAHs, before and after conversion,
and PPS rural hospitals using a nonparametric kernel density estimator and a bootstrap-based test
proposed by Simar and Zelenyuk [18]. In the second stage, a truncated regression with a
bootstrap procedure suggested by Simar and Wilson [19] is used to investigate how the
conditional mean of efficiency scores is influenced by environmental variables such as CAH
status, Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, hospital ownership, etc.
Density analysis and results from bootstrapped truncated regressions show that CAHs are
less cost and allocatively efficient than prospectively paid rural hospitals, without being less
technically efficient. Relative to their pre-conversion selves, CAHs appear to be slightly less
allocatively efficient, while they are slightly more technically efficient and no less cost efficient.
Overall, the results suggest that the CAH program may have decreased allocative and cost
efficiencies of rural hospitals that converted to CAH status relative to prospectively paid rural
hospitals, without significantly increasing their technical efficiency.
In Chapter 3, I examine cost efficiency differences between cost-based reimbursed CAHs
and non-converting, PPS rural hospitals using quality controls and alternative methods of
efficiency analysis (Objective 2). The first method is DEA which is a nonparametric approach
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that uses linear programming to estimate cost efficiency scores. A nonparametric kernel density
estimator is used to estimate the densities of cost efficiency scores of CAH and PPS rural
hospitals, and the null hypothesis on equality between these densities is tested using a bootstrapbased test suggested by Simar and Zelenyuk [18]. The second method is the two-stage, semiparametric approach in which cost efficiency scores, estimated in the first stage using DEA, are
regressed, in the second stage, on explanatory variables expected to influence hospital cost
efficiency. In the second stage, both a tobit model (which has been traditionally used in the
literature) and a truncated regression with a bootstrap procedure suggested by Simar and Wilson
[19] are used to estimate the marginal effects of environmental variables (in particular, CAH
status) on hospital cost efficiency. Although tobit has been historically used in the two-stage
approach applications, Simar and Wilson [19] indicate that tobit is a misspecification under their
statistical model. The third method is stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) which is a parametric
approach based on a cost function.
DEA and SFA were both used to estimate hospital cost efficiency. CAHs were, on
average, 4.5% using DEA and 6.7% using SFA less cost efficient than non-converting rural
hospitals. Density analysis of cost efficiency scores indicated that CAHs were more cost
inefficient than non-converting, PPS rural hospitals and the difference was found statistically
significant based on Simar-Zelenyuk test. Marginal effects of environmental variables were
estimated using SFA and the two-stage DEA approach with both the tobit and truncated
regression. The estimated results showed that the CAH dummy was statistically significant in
SFA and the bootstrap truncated regression models and insignificant in the tobit model.
Specifically, I found that CAHs were 5.2% less cost efficient using bootstrapped truncated
regression, and 7.3% less cost efficient using SFA than non-converting, PPS rural hospitals.
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While these results support our prior findings, they also show how the tobit model in this case
may lead to an alternative interpretation.
In Chapter 4, the research question I seek to answer is: if cost-based reimbursement
creates disincentives for hospitals to operate efficiently, does an increase in Medicare patient mix
have a negative effect on CAHs’ technical efficiency? I use the two-stage approach with single
and double bootstrap procedures suggested by Simar and Wilson [19] to estimate the marginal
effects of environmental variables (in particular, Medicare reimbursement) on CAHs’ technical
efficiency (Objective 3). Simar and Wilson [19] showed that the DEA efficiency scores are
serially correlated and inference in the second stage regression is invalid based on standard
methods. They defined a statistical model where a truncated regression with a (single)
parametric bootstrap procedure allows for valid inference in the second stage. An additional
problem is that the DEA efficiency estimator, although consistent, is biased. In order to address
both the bias and serial correlation of efficiency scores, Simar and Wilson [19] developed a
double bootstrap procedure, where bias-corrected efficiency estimates are obtained in the first
stage using a specific bootstrap procedure. In the second stage, the marginal effects of
environmental variables on (bias-corrected) efficiency scores are estimated using a second,
parametric bootstrap procedure applied to the truncated regression.
An important finding was that the performance of the double bootstrap procedure in
explaining hospital efficiency significantly improved when quality was accounted for in
efficiency estimation relative to a similar model without quality. I also compared the
performance of the double bootstrap procedure with that of the single bootstrap procedure of
Simar and Wilson [19]. While both bootstrap procedures were created to provide valid
inference, the double bootstrap procedure clearly improved statistical efficiency in the second
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stage truncated regression relative to the single bootstrap procedure. The key finding of this
study was that the Medicare percent of admissions variable had an insignificant effect on CAHs’
technical efficiency, suggesting that Medicare cost-based reimbursement may not have created a
disincentive for these hospitals to operate in a less technically efficient manner.
Chapter 5 of this dissertation provides conclusions and examines some policy
implications. In particular, my findings of improved technical efficiency of CAHs in
conjunction with decreased cost efficiency might suggest that the reduction in CAHs’ cost
efficiency may not be a function of direct overconsumption of physical inputs. Rather, decreased
cost efficiency of CAHs may be driven by allocative inefficiency generated by the inability of
these hospitals to quickly substitute to lower input cost combinations in the production process.
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CHAPTER 2
IMPACT OF CONVERSION TO CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITAL STATUS
ON HOSPITAL EFFICIENCY1
2.1 Introduction
The Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Program, introduced by the Balanced Budget Act of
1997, has been created to protect small, financially vulnerable rural hospitals that might be
important for access to health care services in isolated rural areas in the U.S. [1]. A hospital
that converts to CAH status receives Medicare cost-based reimbursement provided it meets
requirements such as restrictions on the maximum number of acute care beds and average
length of inpatient stay. Under cost-based reimbursement, hospitals are reimbursed for the
total costs of providing health care services. This reimbursement method was used by
Medicare to pay for hospital services before 1983. Although access to health care services
and hospital finances improved significantly, cost-based reimbursement led to a rapid
increase in health care costs. Furthermore, historical evidence suggested that it was
associated with inefficiency in hospital operations. Under cost-based reimbursement,
payment levels equaled hospitals’ costs. Thus, it provided incentives for hospitals to
oversupply services, overuse resources, and increase costs in order to increase their revenues
since Medicare paid for services on a cost basis [2-3].
In 1983, Medicare introduced a new payment method known as the Prospective
Payment System (PPS). Medicare classified all illnesses into diagnosis-related groups
(DRGs) and estimated the average cost per case for each group. Under the PPS, hospitals are
paid fixed prices based on the DRGs and are allowed to keep the difference between these

1

NOTICE: this is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Socio-Economic Planning
Sciences. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural
formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have
been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published
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fixed DRG prices and their costs. Thus, the PPS has provided an incentive for hospitals to
reduce costs and increase their efficiency by motivating hospitals to keep their costs below
the PPS rates in order to make profits [4]. Small rural hospitals, however, were particularly
vulnerable to the financial pressures of the PPS and commonly failed to cover costs on
Medicare patients [5].
The CAH Program has been created to preserve access to health care services in
isolated rural communities by improving the financial conditions of small rural hospitals and
preventing their closure. However, there have been concerns that Medicare cost-based
reimbursement has provided a disincentive for CAHs to control costs and operate efficiently.
In the 2005 Report to Congress, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) [6]
states: “Although the CAH Program has helped preserve access to emergency and inpatient
care in isolated areas, it may not have accomplished this goal in an efficient manner.”
The objective of this paper is to determine the impact (if any) of CAH conversion on
hospital efficiency. To achieve this objective, we use recent developments in the area of
efficiency analysis implemented using a two-stage approach. In the first stage, data
envelopment analysis (DEA) is used to estimate hospital cost, technical, and allocative
efficiency scores [7]. In simple terms, a firm is technically efficient if it uses the minimum
quantities of inputs to produce a given level of outputs. For the hospital sector, technical
efficiency refers to the relationship between inputs used (i.e., capital and labor) and outputs
produced (i.e., outpatient visits, inpatient days, surgeries, etc.). Allocative efficiency reflects
the ability of a hospital to produce a given level of outputs using the optimal combination of
inputs (i.e., cost-minimizing), given input prices. A hospital is (overall) cost efficient when it

in Socio-Economic Planning Sciences (DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2012.09.005). Authorization for reproduction can
be found in Appendix 4.
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is both technically and allocatively efficient. Cost efficiency indicates the extent to which the
hospital minimizes the cost of producing a specific level of outputs, given input prices.
Further, the densities of efficiency scores of CAHs and PPS (non-CAH) rural
hospitals (which include hospitals prior to CAH conversion as well as non-converting, PPS
rural hospitals) are estimated and compared using a nonparametric kernel density estimator
and a bootstrap-based test proposed by Simar and Zelenyuk [8]. In the second stage, we use
truncated regressions with bootstrap suggested by Simar and Wilson [9] to investigate how
the conditional mean of efficiency scores is influenced by environmental variables such as
CAH status, Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, and hospital ownership.
Previous studies analyzed the impact of Medicare reimbursement changes on either
cost efficiency [3,10] or technical efficiency of health care facilities [4] using standard
methods such as DEA or stochastic frontier analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first study that examines differences in all three Farrell [11] type efficiency measures
jointly between hospitals operating under different Medicare reimbursement systems, using
methodological advancements proposed by Simar and Zelenyuk [8] and Simar and Wilson
[9]. We hypothesize that cost-based reimbursed CAHs are more cost inefficient than PPS
rural hospitals because of the differences in Medicare reimbursement methods, and thus
incentives, facing these two groups of rural hospitals. Additionally, we analyze not only
whether cost-based reimbursed CAHs are more cost inefficient than PPS rural hospitals but
also whether this cost inefficiency increase comes more from technical inefficiency (i.e.,
hospitals do not use the minimum input quantities to produce their output levels) or allocative
inefficiency (i.e., hospitals do not use the least-cost combination of inputs in producing their
outputs).
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2.2 CAH Program
The CAH Program was introduced as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and it was
subsequently expanded by the Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 and the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003. A hospital that converts to
CAH status has the advantage of receiving Medicare cost-based reimbursement, equivalent to
101 percent of actual cost, for inpatient and outpatient services delivered to Medicare
beneficiaries. However, the hospital must meet several requirements before conversion.
Most importantly, the hospital must be located at least 35 miles by primary road, or 15 miles
by secondary road, from the nearest full service hospital or be declared by the state as a
“necessary provider”; use no more than 25 acute care beds at any one time; annual average
length of stay cannot be greater than four days, and the hospital must provide 24-hour
emergency care services. Before January 2006, states could waive the distance requirement
using the “necessary provider” provision. That is, a state could declare a hospital a
“necessary provider” and qualify it for CAH conversion based on arbitrary criteria. Further,
some CAHs were allowed to exist in Metropolitan Statistical Areas based on state regulations
that declared them rural hospitals. MedPAC [6] estimated that only 17 percent of CAHs are
more than 35 road miles from another provider, 67 percent are 15 to 35 miles, and 16 percent
of CAHs are less than 15 miles from another hospital.
Rural hospitals that converted to CAH status have generally experienced significant
improvements in their finances due to Medicare cost-based reimbursement. For example,
hospitals that converted to CAH status have dramatically increased their Medicare payments
and improved their all-payer profit margins from -1.2 percent in 1998 to 2.2 percent in 2003.
For similar rural hospitals that did not convert to CAH status and remained on PPS all-payer
profit margins declined from 2.2 percent in 1998 to -0.2 percent in 2003. Medicare payments
to CAHs rose, on average, by 9.5 percent per year during the period 1998-2003, compared
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with a 3.3 percent rise for similar rural hospitals that did not convert to CAH status [6].
MedPAC [6] estimated that in 2003 payments per CAH were roughly $850,000 higher under
cost-based reimbursement than they would have been under the PPS.
2.3 Literature Review
The impact of Medicare reimbursement changes on the efficiency of health care facilities has
been an important research topic. Morey and Dittman [12] examined the effect of cost-based
reimbursement on the technical efficiency of North Carolina hospitals operating in 1978.
Using DEA, they found that hospitals with a higher percentage of cost-based reimbursement
tended to be less technically efficient. Sexton et al. [4] analyzed the effect of the PPS on the
technical efficiency of 52 nursing homes in Maine using DEA with four years of data (two
years before and two years after the introduction of the PPS). An unexpected result was that
the average technical efficiency fell after the introduction of the PPS. In their paper, Chern
and Wan [13] analyzed the impact of the PPS on the technical efficiency of hospitals in
Virginia. They used a DEA model with two years of data (1984, before, and 1993, after the
PPS was implemented) lumped together and found no statistically significant differences in
technical efficiency over the study period.
Evaluating the performance of the CAH Program has spurred significant interest in
health services research area. Stensland, Davidson, and Moscovice [14] found that hospitals
that converted to CAH status significantly increased their Medicare revenue, profitability,
employee salaries, and capital expenditures. They estimated that, on average, inflationadjusted revenue of hospitals that converted to CAH status increased by $518,571 per
hospital, half of which was used to cover loses or retained as profits and the other half used to
raise salaries and to cover other expenses. Using a panel data set on 89 rural hospitals in
Iowa, Li, Schneider, and Ward [15] found that hospitals that converted to CAH status
increased their operating revenues, expenses, and profit margins. Similarly, Schoenman and
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Sutton [16] also found that, after conversion to CAH status, hospitals dramatically increased
their profitability due to Medicare cost-based reimbursement. Using a stochastic frontier cost
function, Rosko and Mutter [10] compared the cost inefficiency of CAHs with that of
prospectively paid rural hospitals and found that CAHs were, on average, more cost
inefficient.
2.4 Methodology
To assess the impact of CAH status on hospital efficiency, we use a two-stage approach,
where DEA is used in the first stage to estimate cost, technical, and allocative efficiency
scores of each hospital in the sample. DEA uses linear programming (LP) to define a
piecewise linear estimate of the efficient frontier enveloping all the data. Efficiency of a firm
is measured relative to this efficient (best-practice) frontier. As a nonparametric approach,
DEA does not assume a specific functional form for the frontier or probability distributions
and, thus, avoids any misspecification problems. Its main drawback, however, is that it is
deterministic, meaning that deviations from the efficient frontier are entirely attributed to
inefficiency and no allowance is made for statistical noise, random shocks, or measurement
error. The two-stage approach, however, allows us to deal with this issue in the second stage
regression model. In this study, an input-oriented DEA model is used because (1) it is
consistent with previous literature and with the assumption that hospitals have more control
over the inputs than over the outputs, and (2) it allows a natural decomposition of cost
efficiency into its technical and allocative components.
DEA measures cost efficiency in two steps. First, given input prices and output
levels, the cost-minimizing input vector for each hospital is calculated by LP. Next, cost
efficiency is estimated as the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost and takes a value
between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 indicates a cost efficient hospital. For our specific case,
let yrj be a vector of six outputs (r = 1,…., 6) and xij a vector of two inputs (i = 1, 2) for each
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hospital j (j = 1,….., n). For a given level of outputs yro and an input price vector wio (i = 1,
2) for hospital o, the minimum cost under variable returns to scale (VRS) is obtained by
solving the following LP problem:
Minλ , x*
j

io

∑

2

i =1

∑
∑
∑

n
j =1

n
j =1

n
j =1

wio xio* s.t. :

(1)

λ j yrj ≥ yro , (r = 1,.....,6)
λ j xij ≤ xio* , (i = 1, 2)
λj =1

λ j ≥ 0, ( j = 1,......, n)
where λj and xio* are the decision variables. The optimal solution to this problem is the input
vector xio* that minimizes the cost of producing the observed level of outputs given
technology and input prices. The cost efficiency, CE, is:
CE = ∑i=1 wio xio*
2

∑

2

i =1

wio xio .

(2)

That is, CE is the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost and indicates the proportion of the
hospital’s observed cost required to produce its observed level of outputs [17]. For example,
a cost efficiency score of 0.75 indicates that the hospital is cost inefficient, with cost
inefficiency measured at 33 percent (i.e., 1/0.75 - 1).
The input-oriented measure of technical efficiency (TE) under VRS can be calculated
by solving the following DEA LP problem:
Minλ ,θ θ s.t. :

(3)

j

∑
∑
∑

n
j =1
n
j =1
n
j =1

λ j yrj ≥ yro , (r = 1,.....,6)
λ j xij ≤ θxio , (i = 1, 2)
λj =1

λ j ≥ 0, ( j = 1,......, n)
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The objective of the LP problem in (3) is to find the minimum θ that proportionally reduces
the input vector to θxio while guaranteeing at least the output level yro . The optimal solution
to the LP problem is TE = θ ≤ 1, where TE = 1 indicates a point on the efficient frontier and,
hence, a technically efficient hospital. TE < 1 indicates that it is possible to produce the
observed level of outputs using less than all inputs. That is, a technical efficiency score of
0.85, for example, indicates that the hospital is technically inefficient, with technical
inefficiency measured at 17.6 percent (i.e., 1/0.85 - 1).
Once cost and technical efficiency scores are derived, the allocative efficiency (AE)
can be simply calculated as:
AE = CE / TE.

(4)

The allocative efficiency indicates by how much the cost of the hospital can be reduced if it
selects the input mix that is the most appropriate given the input price ratio faced by the
hospital. From (4), the following relationship can be defined between cost, technical, and
allocative efficiencies:
CE = TE × AE.

(5)

This suggests that failure to achieve cost efficiency may be due to (a) technical inefficiency
in the form of wasteful use of inputs overall, and (b) allocative inefficiency due to the
incorrect mix of inputs given input price levels.
2.4.1 Analysis of Efficiency Distributions

To analyze differences in efficiency between CAHs and non-CAH, PPS rural hospitals, we
first estimate and visualize the densities of efficiency scores using a nonparametric kernel
density estimator. Based on the estimated densities, we test the null hypothesis of equality
between CAH and non-CAH efficiency distributions against the alternative that they are
different. One of the major problems encountered in the analysis of distributions of
efficiency scores arises from the fact that, in finite samples, the DEA efficiency estimator is
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biased (however, it is a consistent estimator [18]) and the estimated efficiency scores are not
independent [8-9].
Building on the work of Li [19], Simar and Zelenyuk [8] proposed a bootstrappedbased test for testing equality of distributions of DEA-estimated efficiency scores. To briefly
outline the test statistics, suppose group A is the group of CAHs and group Z is the group of
non-CAH, PPS rural hospitals. We are interested to test the null hypothesis of equality
between the efficiency distributions of the two groups against the alternative that they are
different:
H0: fA(uA) = fZ(uZ)
H1: fA(uA) ≠ fZ(uZ)

where u A,i (i = 1,...., n A ) and u Z ,k (k = 1,...., nZ ) are the efficiency scores of CAHs and nonCAH, PPS rural hospitals and fA(uA) and fZ(uZ) are the corresponding probability
distributions. The Li [19] test statistics is:
d
Jˆ nA ,nZ ,h = n A h1/ 2 IˆnA ,nZ ,h / σˆ λ ,h ⎯⎯→
N (0,1)

(6)

where
1 n A n A ⎛ u − u A ,k
IˆnA ,nZ ,h = 2 ∑∑ K ⎜⎜ A,i
n A h i=1 k =1 ⎝
h
1 nZ nA ⎛ u Z ,i
−
∑∑ K ⎜
n A nZ h i =1 k =1 ⎜⎝

⎞ 1 nZ nZ ⎛ u Z ,i − u Z ,k ⎞
⎟⎟ + 2 ∑∑ K ⎜⎜
⎟⎟
h
⎠ nZ h i =1 k =1 ⎝
⎠
n A nZ
− u A ,k ⎞
⎛ u − u Z ,k
1
⎟⎟ −
K ⎜⎜ A,i
∑∑
h
h
⎠ nZ n A h i=1 k =1 ⎝

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

(7)

and
⎧ 1 nA nA ⎛ u A,i − u A,k
K ⎜⎜
2 ∑∑
h
⎩ n A h i=1 k =1 ⎝

σˆ λ2,h = 2⎨

⎛ u − u A, k
K ⎜⎜ Z ,i
−
∑∑
n A nZ h i=1 k =1 ⎝
h

λn

nZ

nA

⎞ λ2n nZ nZ ⎛ u Z ,i − u Z ,k
⎟⎟ + 2 ∑∑ K ⎜⎜
h
⎠ nZ h i=1 k =1 ⎝

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

⎞
λn nA nZ ⎛ u A,i − u Z ,k
⎟⎟ −
∑∑ K ⎜⎜ h
⎠ nZ n A h i=1 k =1 ⎝

⎞⎫
⎟⎟⎬ × ∫ K 2 (u )du
⎠⎭

where K is a kernel function (assumed to be Gaussian), h is a bandwidth, λn = n A / nZ ,
n = n A + nZ , λn → λ when n A → ∞ , and λ ∈ (0, ∞) is a constant.
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(8)

Simar and Zelenyuk [8] noted that an important problem encountered in the
application of the test is the discontinuity problem. By construction, some of the DEA
efficiency scores equal to 1, creating a spurious mass at unity and violating the continuity
assumption required to ensure consistency of the density estimation. They suggested two
approaches to deal with the discontinuity problem. The first approach is based on
computation and bootstrapping the Li test using the sample of DEA efficiency scores without
those equal to unity. The second approach is based on computation and bootstrapping the Li
test using the sample of DEA efficiency scores where those equal to unity are “smoothed”
away from the boundary by adding a small amount of noise (see Simar and Zelenyuk [8] for
the bootstrap algorithm for Li statistics). We adopt the second approach with a Gaussian
kernel and a bandwidth selected using Silverman [20].
2.4.2 Second Stage Truncated Regression

In the second stage, cost, technical, and allocative efficiency scores, obtained in the first stage
using DEA, are regressed on a set of explanatory variables to investigate the dependency of
efficiency scores on such variables. In an influential paper, Simar and Wilson [9] criticized
previous two-stage studies because of the failure to define a statistical model consistent with
the second stage analysis. They argue that inference in those studies is invalid because of the
failure to account for the serial correlation present among efficiency estimates used in the
second stage regression. Simar and Wilson [9] defined a statistical model in which a
truncated regression with a bootstrap procedure allows for valid inference in the second stage
analysis. Following Simar and Wilson [9], our second stage model is specified as a truncated
regression:
uˆi = zi β + ε i ≥ 1 ,

i = 1, 2, …., n

(9)
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where ûi is the reciprocal of efficiency scores2 (which are referred to as inefficiency scores)

such that uˆi ≥ 1 , εi is assumed to be distributed N(0, σ2) with left truncation at 1 − zi β , zi is a
vector of k environmental variables which are thought to have an effect on hospital
efficiency, and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Unfortunately, in (9), ûi ’s are
serially correlated in a complicated, unknown way. To provide valid inference in the second
stage analysis, Simar and Wilson [9] suggested a parametric bootstrap of the truncated
regression. In this paper, we use their Algorithm 1 bootstrap procedure whose steps are the
following:
1. Use the method of maximum likelihood to obtain an estimate β̂ of β in the truncated
regression uˆi = zi β + ε i > 1 , using m < n observations where uˆi > 1 (i = 1, …, m).
2. Loop over the next three steps L = 2000 times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates

{ }

Δ = βˆ *

L

b =1

:

a. For each i = 1,…., m, draw εi from N(0, σˆ 2 ) with left truncation at 1 − zi β̂ .
b. Compute ui* = zi βˆ + ε i , i = 1,….., m .
c. Estimate the truncated regression of ui* on zi, yielding estimates β̂ * .
3. Use the bootstrap values in Δ and the original estimates of β̂ to construct percentile
confidence intervals for each element of β.
Step 2 is a parametric bootstrap of a truncated regression model. The bootstrapped
coefficients for each resample are estimated and placed in an L× k matrix. Once the bootstrap
values in Δ are obtained, percentile bootstrap confidence intervals can be constructed for each
element of β.

2

Such a parameterization of efficiency scores will give us a dependent variable with only a lower bound at 1 in
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2.5 Data

In this study, we use four years of data (1997, 1998, 2005, and 2006) from the American
Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals, the Area Resource File and the
Medicare Hospital Cost Report. To assess the impact of CAH conversion on hospital
efficiency, we examine changes in efficiency for a sample of rural hospitals classified as
CAHs in 2005 and 2006 (post-conversion period) that were PPS hospitals in 1997 and 1998
(pre-conversion period). We also include a control group of non-converting rural hospitals
with less than seventy-six beds which retained the PPS status throughout the study period
[10]. Consistent with previous literature, we recognize the difficulty of creating a control
group since hospitals choose to convert to CAH status and any comparison group will differ
from converting hospitals [14]. However, this criterion allowed us to have two groups of
hospitals of similar size (the mean for CAH total beds in our sample was 41 while for nonconverting rural hospitals was 46.8) while maintaining a measurable number of observations
for the comparison group. While selection issues may be of concern, Rosko and Mutter [10]
indicate that an approach in which CAHs are compared not only to non-converting rural
hospitals but also to pre-conversion selves may mitigate these issues. A total of 797 CAHs
and 298 non-converting, PPS rural hospitals in each of the four years were included in our
initial sample. For consistency, we eliminated 159 CAHs located in Metropolitan Statistical
Areas.
The DEA-cost model used in this study requires information on hospital outputs,
inputs, and input prices. All hospital efficiency studies included both inpatient and outpatient
outputs. The number of outpatient visits has been consistently used as a measure of
outpatient output. Similarly, the numbers of admissions and post-admission days (inpatient

the second stage truncated regression, unlike the original efficiency measures that are bounded by 0 and 1.
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days – admissions) have been used as measures of inpatient outputs [10,21]. Additionally,
hospital outputs are heterogeneous and researchers have included variables such as
emergency room visits, outpatient surgeries, and births to control for output heterogeneity.
Our choice of outputs was guided by previous literature [10,21] and includes outpatient visits,
admissions, post-admission days, emergency room visits, outpatient surgeries, and births
(Table 2.1). Due to data constraints, input price variables were also similar in hospital
efficiency studies [10,21]. Following this literature, we use two input prices: the price of
labor (sum of payroll expenses and employee benefits divided by the full-time equivalent
(FTE) facility personnel), and the price of capital (sum of depreciation expenses and interest
expenses − obtained from the Medicare Hospital Cost Report – divided by the number of
facility beds). The corresponding physical inputs used in this analysis consist of FTE
personnel and total staffed and licensed facility beds (a proxy for capital) [17].
For the choice of variables used in the second stage (Table 2.1), we followed recent
literature on hospital efficiency for the specification of environmental variables [10,22]. The
primary variable of interest is a CAH dummy (one if the hospital is a CAH and zero,
otherwise) which is used to measure the impact of conversion to CAH status on hospital
efficiency. Previous literature showed that Medicare and Medicaid exert financial pressure
and can create incentives for hospitals to operate more efficiently. Medicare is a federal
program that pays for services for the aged while Medicaid is a joint federal and state
program for the poor. It has been shown that Medicaid typically underpays hospitals more
than Medicare and exerts cost containment pressure irrespective of the payment mechanism
[22]. On the other hand, the effect of Medicare on hospital efficiency has been shown to be
dependent on the payment mechanism. Specifically, reimbursement under Medicare PPS
creates incentives for reducing inefficiency while cost-based reimbursement might give
hospitals few incentives to control their costs. We follow previous literature [10,22] and use
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two variables to reflect the external pressure for efficiency of public payers: Medicare percent
of admissions (Medicare) ((Medicare admissions / total admissions) × 100) and Medicaid
percent of admissions (Medicaid) ((Medicaid admissions / total admissions) × 100). While
Medicaid percent of admissions is expected to be inversely associated with hospital
inefficiency given the cost containment pressure from Medicaid, the effect of Medicare
percent of admissions on hospital inefficiency is ambiguous given the joint use in estimation
of cost-based reimbursed CAHs and PPS-reimbursed rural hospitals.

Table 2.1. Variable definitions and summary statistics.
CAH
Variable
Outputs
Total hospital admissions
Post-admission days
Total outpatient visits
Emergency room visits
Outpatient surgeries
Total births
Inputs
Staffed and licensed facility beds

Rural

Mean

Std. dev.

Mean

Std. dev.

801.56
8,580.56
24,676.48

596.89
10,147.13
23,143.57

1,839.01
5,829.26
40,654.53

911.01
3,145.29
32,353.93

4,509.50
501.23
71.72

4,000.33
539.00
103.82

9,070.30
1,098.10
207.98

5,554.56
916.12
198.88

46.04

33.39

46.83

14.76

Full time equivalent (FTE) employees
Input Prices
Price of capital($)

141.48

87.97

221.18

112.32

17,890.96

21,752.43

26,111.02

23,210.37

Price of labor($)

38,759.67

15,108.06

41,073.32

13,803.73

Environmental
Variables

Variable Definition

Government
For-profit
Medicare

Government hospital (1 or 0)
For-profit hospital (1 or 0)
% Medicare admissions

0.51
0.03
56.86

13.72

0.38
0.17
51.44

11.86

Medicaid
HHI
System
MHMO
Income

% Medicaid admissions
Herfindahl-Hirschman index
Multihospital system (1 or 0)
% Medicare HMO penetration
Median household income

12.11
0.57
0.29
2.60
34,681.38

7.96
0.35
5.43
6,794.81

16.83
0.58
0.39
3.14
33,481.79

9.47
0.34
6.05
8,528.68

Emergency
Surgeries

% Emergency room visits
% Outpatient surgeries

23.10
2.41

18.39
2.53

28.61
3.35

18.30
3.41

Births

% Admissions for birth

7.93

9.13

10.40

8.86
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The ownership status is introduced by using dummy variables that define government
hospitals (Government), non-profit hospitals and for-profit hospitals (For-profit). Non-profit
ownership is the reference category. Consistent with Property Rights Theory (PRT), we
expect that for-profit hospitals will place a greater emphasis on earning profits and increasing
efficiency than non-profit or government hospitals.
A source of external pressure for efficiency is Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) penetration. Following Rosko and Mutter [10], we used Medicare HMO penetration
(MHMO) from the Area Resource File as a proxy for general HMO penetration. A
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) (calculated by summing the squares of the market shares
of admissions for all of the hospitals in the county) is used to control for competitive pressure
in a hospital’s market (defined as the county). Median household income of the county
(Income) and a dummy variable for membership in a multihospital system (System) are also
included in the second stage regression to explain hospital inefficiency. In addition, dummy
variables for each year are included to account for the time effects, with year 1997 as the
reference category.
A particular challenge was adjusting outputs to control for case-mix variations.
Researchers usually employ a case-mix index − which is a measure of the relative complexity
of the patient mix treated in a hospital − to adjust outputs. Unfortunately, there is no casemix index available for CAHs as these hospitals are exempted from the PPS. Although we
are unable to adjust outputs for case-mix, we follow Pilyavsky et al. [23] and control for casemix variations in the second stage regression using proxies such as percent of emergency
room visits (Emergency) ((emergency room visits / outpatient visits) × 100), percent of
outpatient surgeries (Surgeries) ((outpatient surgeries / outpatient visits) × 100) and percent
of births (Births) ((births / admissions) × 100). Furthermore, Ozgen and Ozcan [24] noted
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that the lack of case-mix variables in DEA efficiency models is in part compensated by the
specification of multiple outputs.
A limitation of this research is the lack of any controls for quality of care. While
controlling for quality is important in hospital efficiency studies, finding adequate measures
of quality has been difficult. In hospital efficiency studies, the difficulty of controlling for
quality relates in principal to data availability [25]. Since 2004, Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) Hospital Compare database has provided some quality measures
but, unfortunately, the proportion of CAHs reporting quality information has been very small.
Only 41 percent of CAHs reported at least one quality measure to Hospital Compare in 2004
[26], making it difficult to find a measurable number of hospitals that reported information on
the same quality measures. Our examination of the 2005 Hospital Compare database showed
that only 186 CAHs reported information for two of the most common quality measures for
pneumonia. CAHs voluntarily report quality information to CMS and they do not have the
financial incentives of PPS hospitals to consistently report such information. In our study,
controlling for quality is even more difficult because of the lack of quality measures collected
and reported by rural hospitals in 1997 and 1998 which are required for purposes of the
policy analysis.
Variable definitions for DEA as well as for the second stage truncated regressions are
presented in Table 2.1. Summary statistics of these variables are presented for both CAHs
(joint data for all four years, irrespective of conversion) and the control group of nonconverting, PPS rural hospitals.
2.6 Results and Discussion

In the first stage, we estimated a DEA model with the four years of data jointly. Such
pooling of the data over time is a frequent practice in DEA estimation and offers the
advantage of a substantial increase in the sample size which is important for obtaining
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reliable estimates of efficiency [27]. As a preliminary analysis, a kernel density estimator is
used to obtain estimates of densities of cost, technical, and allocative inefficiencies (the
reciprocal of original efficiency scores). The estimated densities were visualized and
indicated that some outliers were present in the sample as shown by the long tails of the
densities that stretch out up to inefficiency scores of 10 or 12 (see Figure A.2.1 in Appendix
1). Because such outliers can be very problematic for the convergence of the likelihood
function in the second stage, we follow Zelenyuk and Zeka [27] and trim the right tails of the
distributions resulting in 165 observations being eliminated from the sample. As sensitivity
analysis, we performed a Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test in order to test the null hypothesis
of equality of cost inefficiency distributions between the samples before and after the
trimming. Based on this test, we failed to reject the null hypothesis (bootstrap p-value was
0.70) indicating that the trimming had an insignificant effect on the estimated inefficiency
distributions. Table 2.2 (column 2) presents the distributions of CAHs and non-CAH, PPS
rural hospitals in the sample, by year, after the trimming of outliers. All estimations are
based on this trimmed sample.

Table 2.2. Summary statistics of DEA estimated efficiency scores.
Cost
Efficiency
Group

Technical
Efficiency

Allocative
Efficiency

N

Mean

Std. dev.

Mean

Std. dev.

Mean

Std. dev.

750
752
771
767
293

0.464
0.462
0.458
0.455
0.580

0.144
0.138
0.129
0.130
0.178

0.673
0.676
0.645
0.645
0.694

0.152
0.150
0.153
0.149
0.147

0.693
0.688
0.718
0.713
0.826

0.138
0.137
0.139
0.138
0.121

Rural2005
Rural1997
Rural1998
CAH

295
294
293
1,502

0.586
0.516
0.531
0.463

0.170
0.152
0.147
0.141

0.703
0.652
0.658
0.674

0.144
0.141
0.133
0.151

0.825
0.789
0.804
0.690

0.119
0.128
0.124
0.138

Non-CAH

2,713

0.498

0.153

0.659

0.149

0.757

0.140

All

4,215

0.486

0.150

0.665

0.149

0.733

0.143

CAH2006
CAH2005
Pre-CAH1997
Pre-CAH1998
Rural2006
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Table 2.2 also shows summary statistics of DEA-estimated cost, technical, and
allocative efficiency scores for CAHs and non-CAH, PPS rural hospitals in each year as well
as combined. The average level of cost efficiency for CAHs changed only slightly over the
study period (from 45.5 percent in 1998, before conversion to CAH status, to 46.4 in 2006),
while for the comparison group of non-converting, PPS rural hospitals, cost efficiency
increased from 51.6 percent in 1997 to 58 percent in 2006. While mean technical efficiency
increased for both groups, mean allocative efficiency decreased for CAHs from 71.8 percent
in 1997 (in the pre-conversion period) to 69 percent in 2006 (after conversion to CAH status),
while it increased for the non-converting rural hospitals from 79 percent to 82.6 percent over
the same period.
2.6.1 Analysis of Inefficiency Distributions

Figure 2.1 shows the distributions of inefficiency scores for CAHs and the comparison group
of non-converting, PPS rural hospitals in 2005 and 2006. We observe a large rightward shift
from the efficient unity of the distributions of cost and allocative inefficiency scores of CAHs
relative to those of non-converting rural hospitals in 2005 and 2006, suggesting that CAHs
tend to be less cost and allocatively efficient than non-converting rural hospitals. The results
are also supported by the Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li tests (Table 2.3) which strongly
rejected the null hypotheses on equalities of inefficiency distributions between CAHs and
non-converting, PPS rural hospitals. On the other hand, the differences are not so clear in
terms of technical inefficiency distributions between CAHs and non-converting, PPS rural
hospitals, and the Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test rejected the null hypothesis of equality
only for 2005.
Figure 2.2 shows the distributions of inefficiency scores of hospitals before (1997 and
1998) and after (2005 and 2006) the conversion to CAH status. Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li
tests (Table 2.3) in conjunction with estimated densities show that CAHs in 2005 and 2006
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tend to be slightly less allocatively efficient while they are slightly more technically efficient
relative to their pre-conversion selves. In terms of cost inefficiency distributions, there seems
to be no significant differences over the same period of time.
A comparison of inefficiency distributions between all CAHs and all non-CAH rural
hospitals in our sample (Figure 2.3) shows that CAHs are less allocatively and cost efficient,
while they tend to be slightly more technically efficient, than non-CAH, PPS rural hospitals.
However, the difference in technical inefficiency between CAHs and non-CAH rural
hospitals is not statistically significant as indicated by Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test in
Table 2.3.

Table 2.3. Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test for equality of inefficiency distributions.
Cost
Inefficiency
Null Hypothesis

Li test

f(cah06)=f(rur06)
f(cah05)=f(rur05)
f(cah06)=f(cah97)
f(cah06)=f(cah98)

Allocative
Inefficiency

a

p-val

Li test

25.58
32.59
1.35
-0.23

0.000
0.000
0.068
0.800

f(cah05)=f(cah97)
f(cah05)=f(cah98)

1.43
0.00

f(cah)=f(non-cah)

12.67

Technical
Inefficiency

a

a

p-val

Li test

p-val

37.07
40.49
1.58
0.60

0.000
0.000
0.042
0.419

0.22
1.77
1.97
1.30

0.809
0.040
0.027
0.070

0.055
0.999

2.31
0.80

0.013
0.248

2.11
2.20

0.024
0.023

0.000

45.64

0.000

0.70

0.425

a

Bootstrap p-value. The number of bootstrap iterations is 2000. All estimations are done by authors in Matlab
adopting from programs written for [8].

2.6.2 Bootstrapped Truncated Regressions

Table 2.4 summarizes the results of bootstrapped truncated regressions in which cost,
technical, and allocative inefficiency scores are regressed against a set of environmental
variables (see Tables A.2.5, A.2.6, and A.2.7 in Appendix 1 for percentile bootstrap
confidence intervals). As an interpretation rule, a positive (negative) coefficient indicates a
positive (negative) effect on hospital inefficiency.
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Figure 2.1. Densities of inefficiency scores: CAHs vs. non-converting, PPS rural hospitals in
2005 and 2006.
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Figure 2.2. Densities of inefficiency scores: CAHs in 2005 and 2006 vs. pre-conversion
hospitals in 1997 and 1998.
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Figure 2.3. Densities of inefficiency scores: CAHs vs. non-CAH, PPS rural hospitals.
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The primary variable of interest is the CAH dummy which indicates whether CAHs
are more or less inefficient relative to the non-CAH, PPS rural hospitals. The results show
that the coefficient of the CAH dummy is positive and significant at the 1 percent level in the
cost and allocative inefficiency models and insignificant in the technical inefficiency model,
suggesting that CAHs are more cost and allocatively inefficient than non-CAH, PPS rural
hospitals, while they are no less technically efficient. These results support, in part, our
hypothesis that CAHs are less cost efficient than non-CAH, PPS rural hospitals because of
the differences in Medicare reimbursement facing these hospitals.
The results also show that for-profit hospitals are less cost and allocatively inefficient
than non-profit hospitals, while government hospitals are more cost, technically, and
allocatively inefficient relative to non-profit ones. These results are consistent with PRT
which suggests that for-profit hospitals are more efficient than non-profit and government
hospitals because a profit maximization objective requires hospitals to reduce their costs and
use their resources in an efficient manner.
The estimated results show that Medicare share of admissions has a positive and
significant effect on the cost and technical inefficiencies of hospitals. This is in contrast with
the negative effect of the same variable on the hospital cost inefficiency found by Rosko and
Mutter [10]. An explanation for this discrepancy is that both papers analyze a joint set of
cost-based reimbursed CAHs and PPS reimbursed rural hospitals and one can expect an
inconclusive effect of Medicare share of admissions on hospital efficiency in this situation.
Alternatively, our results show that Medicaid share of admissions has a negative and
significant effect (at the 1 percent level) on the cost and technical inefficiencies of hospitals.
It is well known that Medicaid payments are low and that Medicaid typically underpays
hospitals forcing them to reduce costs in order to maintain their financial viability. Thus, our
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results are consistent with prior research which has shown that Medicaid exerts cost
containment pressure and provides a strong incentive for efficiency [22].

Table 2.4. Results of bootstrapped truncated regressions.
Variable
CAH
Government
For-profit
Medicare
Medicaid
HHI
System
Income
MHMO
Emergency
Surgeries
Births
2006
2005
1998

Cost
Inefficiency

Technical
Inefficiency

Allocative
Inefficiency

0.3987***
0.2028***

0.0217
0.1374***

0.5482***
0.0746***

-0.1453***
0.0043***
-0.0058***
0.0171
-0.1535***

0.0501
0.0034***
-0.0053***
0.0806***
-0.0935***

-0.2948***
0.0007
-0.00003
-0.0731***
-0.0524**

-0.000006***
-0.0054***
-0.0006
-0.0035

-0.000005***
-0.0059***
0.0005
-0.0043

0.000001
0.0014
-0.0010*
-0.0019

-0.0076***
-0.2987***
-0.3417***

-0.0011
-0.0749**
-0.1209***

-0.0085***
-0.4124***
-0.3980***

-0.0165

-0.0184

-0.0136

Constant
2.3273***
1.5242***
1.2826***
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
a
Estimation based on Algorithm 1 of Simar and Wilson [9], with 2000 bootstrap replications for confidence
intervals of the estimated coefficients. All estimations are done by authors in Stata 11.

System membership has a negative and significant effect on hospital inefficiency,
suggesting that hospitals belonging to a multihospital system are less cost, technically, and
allocatively inefficient than non-system hospitals. These results are consistent with previous
literature which suggests that system membership may enhance hospital performance because
hospital systems enjoy economies of scale in production, eliminate duplicative administrative
functions, and have greater bargaining power in the market [22]. Similarly, the negative
effect of Medicare HMO on hospital cost and technical inefficiencies suggests that Medicare
HMO penetration creates pressure for hospitals to operate more efficiently. In particular,
health maintenance organizations have contributed to health care cost containment by using
their market power to extract large discounts from providers and, thus, forcing hospitals to
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reduce costs in order to remain financially viable [28]. We also found a negative and
significant effect (however, small in magnitude) of the county median household income on
the cost and technical inefficiencies.
The results show that HHI has an insignificant coefficient in the cost inefficiency
model, while the coefficient is negative and significant in the allocative inefficiency model
and positive and significant in the technical inefficiency model. Previous literature also
reported mixed findings with respect to the effect of HHI on hospital efficiency. For
example, an inverse relation between HHI and hospital inefficiency, suggesting that a
decrease in HHI (or an increase in hospital competition) leads to an increase in hospital
inefficiency, was associated with the theory of service-based competition. That is, hospitals
in more competitive markets have higher costs and tend to be more inefficient because they
compete for patients based on the services provided. Alternatively, the theory of price-based
competition predicts that if competition is increased hospitals will compete for patients by
reducing costs and improving efficiency [22].
Our results also indicate that hospitals (both CAHs and non-converting, PPS rural
hospitals) in 2005 and 2006 are more cost, technically, and allocatively efficient relative to
the same set of hospitals in 1997. This may raise concerns that pooling all data across all
time may lead to a trending issue. While the yearly dummies were included to control for
time effects, we also performed sensitivity analysis and estimated the models using only data
for 2005 and 2006. Specifically, DEA was used, in the first stage, with 2005 and 2006 data
jointly to estimate cost, technical, and allocative efficiency scores. The null hypothesis on
equality of cost efficiency distributions between 2005 and 2006 was tested and failed to reject
(based on Simar-Zelenyuk test with a bootstrap p-value = 0.56). Similarly, the equality of
technical efficiency distributions between 2005 and 2006 was not rejected (bootstrap p-value
= 0.63). Second stage bootstrapped truncated regressions were estimated with pooled data
37

for the two years. The results were consistent and similar to the estimated models with
pooled data for all four years, suggesting that our results were robust (see Table A.2.8 in
Appendix 1).
2.6.3 Discussion

The CAH Program appears to have created two separate incentive structures for those rural
hospitals that converted to CAH status. The first, a change in mission, appears to have
increased the technical efficiency of CAHs in 2005 and 2006 relative to their pre-conversion
selves in 1997 and 1998, as shown by the results in Table 2.2 and by the density analysis. At
the same time, CAHs appear to be as technically efficient as non-CAH, PPS rural hospitals in
our sample, as shown by density analysis and bootstrapped truncated regression results. It is
possible that the program’s mission change requirements (limitations on the maximum
number of acute care beds to 25 and average length of stay to 4 days) may have resulted in
the same proportional technical efficiency improvements that PPS cost containment pressures
may have had on the non-converting rural hospitals. It might also be the case that all the
hospitals in the study experienced general improvements in technical efficiency over the
study period.
The second incentive structure associated with CAH conversion is Medicare costbased reimbursement which has dramatically changed hospitals’ financial incentives.
Previous research found that hospitals that converted to CAH status significantly increased
their Medicare revenue, profitability, employee salaries, and capital expenditures due to
Medicare cost-based reimbursement [14]. Furthermore, the average salary per FTE employee
increased dramatically for hospitals after CAH conversion while it increased only modestly
for non-converting, PPS rural hospitals [16]. Thus, it may be the case that the allocative
efficiency declines may be due to the inability of CAH hospitals to substitute away from the
higher labor costs identified by previous literature.
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Alternatively, anecdotal evidence suggests that after CAH hospitals improved their
balance sheets post-conversion, they may have embarked on construction of new hospitals or
major infrastructure upgrades at existing CAH hospital locations. These infrastructure
improvements add to the average fixed cost of hospitals. Such increased fixed capital
expenditure (which cannot be substituted away from) may lead to increased allocative
inefficiency in the short term that is mitigated in the longer term as these capital costs are
spread over a longer time horizon.3
2.7 Conclusions

This study analyzed the impact of conversion to CAH status on hospital efficiency using a
two-stage approach and recent methodological advancements in efficiency analysis. In the
first stage, DEA was used to estimate hospital cost, allocative, and technical efficiency
scores. Using a kernel density estimator and a bootstrap-based test, we estimated and
compared the distributions of inefficiency scores of CAH hospitals before and after
conversion, as well as with those of a comparison group of non-converting, PPS rural
hospitals. In the second stage, bootstrapped truncated regressions were estimated in which
cost, technical, and allocative inefficiencies were regressed on explanatory variables.
The results of Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test and density analysis showed that
CAHs were less cost and allocatively efficient than the comparison group of non-converting
rural hospitals in 2005 and 2006, while they were no less technically efficient. When
compared with their pre-conversion selves in 1997 and 1998, CAHs appeared to be slightly
less allocatively efficient, while they were slightly more technically efficient and no less cost

3

Allocative inefficiency may be driven by the depreciation schedule. Infrastructure improvements (including
equipment) may have an accelerated depreciation rate in years just after construction/purchase with reduced
depreciation in later years. This would result in CAH hospitals making these improvements to show increased
allocative inefficiency in the short term, but allocative efficiency improvements in the long term as the
annualized price of capital shifts the isocost curve back toward a lower cost input mix with labor.
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efficient. The second stage bootstrapped truncated regression results showed that CAHs were
less cost and allocatively efficient than non-CAH, PPS rural hospitals, while they were no
less technically efficient.
A shortcoming of this research is the lack of quality controls. While our results would
have been strengthened with the inclusion of quality measures, the approach taken here to
study the impact of CAH conversion on hospital efficiency made it impossible to find quality
measures for the two years before conversion (1997 and 1998). As new data become
available, future research on CAH efficiency should incorporate quality controls in the
methodological advancements proposed by Simar and Wilson [9].
The Critical Access Hospital program has created incentives to maintain inpatient
access in remote rural areas of the U.S. at an increased cost. While the results suggest that
overall economic (cost) efficiency declined, the inability to quickly substitute to lower cost
inputs as input prices change may be the leading driver of that inefficiency. Federal
programs should consider strategies that help CAH hospitals reduce labor inputs as their
labor costs increase as well as identify lower cost models for providing up-to-date facilities
and equipment.
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CHAPTER 3
COST EFFICIENCY OF RURAL HOSPITALS:
DEA, TWO-STAGE APPROACH, AND STOCHASTIC FRONTIER ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
In this study, I compare the performance of two groups of rural hospitals in the U.S. operating
under different Medicare reimbursement systems. Specifically, I statistically test for cost
efficiency differences between cost-based reimbursed Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs) and
rural hospitals reimbursed under the Prospective Payment System (PPS) using three
methodological approaches. The first method is data envelopment analysis (DEA) which is a
nonparametric approach that uses linear programming to estimate cost efficiency scores. A
nonparametric kernel density estimator is used to estimate the densities of cost efficiency scores
of CAH and PPS rural hospitals, and the null hypothesis on equality between these densities is
tested using a bootstrap-based test suggested by Simar and Zelenyuk [1]. The second method is
the two-stage, semi-parametric approach in which cost efficiency scores, estimated in the first
stage using DEA, are regressed, in the second stage, on explanatory variables expected to
influence hospital cost efficiency. In the second stage, both a tobit model (which has been
traditionally used in the literature) and a truncated regression with a bootstrap procedure
suggested by Simar and Wilson [2] are used to make inferences about the impact of
environmental variables (in particular, CAH status) on hospital cost efficiency. Finally, the third
method is stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) which is a parametric approach based on a cost
function.
The CAH Program was created in 1997 in response to the dramatic deterioration of
financial conditions (and the potential threat of closure) of small rural hospitals. Medicare has
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paid enhanced cost-based reimbursement, representing 101 percent of costs, to rural hospitals
participating in the CAH Program, providing they meet several requirements before conversion.1
In contrast, Medicare PPS pays the remainder hospitals a fixed price per case based on the
diagnosis related group (DRG), allowing hospitals to keep the difference between this fixed price
and actual cost. The two reimbursement methods provide different incentives for hospitals. In
particular, Medicare cost-based reimbursement − which was the reimbursement method for
hospitals before 1983 − provided an incentive for hospitals to increase costs in order to receive
higher revenues because Medicare paid for the total cost of services [3-4]. The PPS, on the other
hand, has been designed to promote efficiency in hospital operations by motivating hospitals to
keep their costs below the PPS reimbursement rates [5].
In the efficiency analysis literature, there has been considerable interest in reconciling
SFA and DEA [6]. Two of the studies that compared the two methods are Chiricos and Sear [7]
for US hospitals and Jacobs [8] for hospitals in the UK. Both studies found significant
differences between the results from the two approaches. Using SFA, Rosko and Mutter [9]
compared the cost inefficiency of CAHs with that of non-CAH rural hospitals and found that, on
average, CAHs were more cost inefficient than non-CAH rural hospitals.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study providing empirical applications of
methodological approaches of efficiency analysis ranging from fully nonparametric, to semiparametric, and to fully parametric to analyze cost efficiency differences between two groups of
rural hospitals operating under different Medicare reimbursement systems. A nonparametric

1

To be eligible for CAH conversion, a hospital must be located at least 35 miles by primary road, or 15 miles by
secondary road, from another hospital; use no more than 25 acute care beds (however, CAHs have no limitations on
non-acute care beds); annual average length of stay cannot be greater than 4 days, and the hospital must provide 24hour emergency care services.
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approach, such as DEA, requires minimal statistical assumptions and, thus, avoids the risk of
specification error. However, the deterministic nature of DEA does not account for statistical
noise in efficiency estimation. A fully parametric approach, such as SFA, requires restrictive
assumptions in terms of a functional form and probability distributions, but it accounts for
statistical noise in efficiency estimation. A semi-parametric approach, such as the two-stage
approach, is less restrictive than SFA in the sense that some features of the statistical model are
left unspecified.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 DEA Cost Efficiency Estimator
DEA uses linear programming to construct a piecewise linear estimate of the best-practice
(efficient) frontier enveloping all the data. The efficiency score of a firm is measured relative to
this best-practice frontier. As a nonparametric method, DEA requires no specific assumptions
about the functional form of the frontier and, thus, avoids any misspecification problems.
However, DEA is deterministic, meaning that deviations from the efficient frontier are entirely
assumed to be due to inefficiency and no allowance is made for statistical noise or measurement
error. Nevertheless, some good statistical properties have been recently unveiled for the DEA
efficiency estimator, the most important of which is consistency [10].
DEA measures cost efficiency in two steps. First, given input prices and output levels,
the cost-minimizing input vector for each hospital is calculated using linear programming (LP).
Specifically, let yrj be an output vector (r = 1,…, m) and xij an input vector (i = 1,…., k) for
hospital j (j = 1,…., n). For a given output level yro and an input price vector wio for hospital o,
the minimum cost under the assumption of variable returns to scale is obtained by solving the
following LP problem:
45

Minλ , x*
j

io

{∑

k

i =1

∑

n
j =1

wio xio* |

}

λ j y rj ≥ y ro , (r = 1,...., m), ∑ j =1 λ j xij ≤ x , (i = 1,...., k ), ∑ j =1 λ j = 1, λ j ≥ 0
n

*
io

n

(1)

The optimal solution to this LP problem is the input vector xio* which minimizes the cost of
producing the observed level of outputs given input prices. Cost efficiency δ is measured as the
ratio of minimum cost to observed cost and takes a value between 0 and 1, where a value of 1
indicates a cost efficient hospital:

δ = ∑i =1 wio xio*
k

∑

k

i =1

wio xio .

(2)

3.2.2 Density Analysis of DEA Efficiency Scores
Simply comparing only the sample means of DEA cost efficiency scores of CAHs and nonconverting rural hospitals may not provide a complete picture. An alternative approach is to
estimate and compare the densities of efficiency scores of the two groups of rural hospitals.
There are, however, two important problems with this approach: (1) some of the DEA efficiency
scores equal to 1, by construction, violating the continuity assumption required for consistency
of the kernel density estimation, and (2) in finite samples, the estimated efficiency scores are
biased and not independent (however both these problems vanish asymptotically). To address
these problems, Simar and Zelenyuk [1] suggested kernel methods to consistently estimate the
densities of DEA estimated efficiency scores and proposed a bootstrapped-based test for testing
the null hypothesis on equality of these densities (see Simar and Zelenyuk [1], for details).
3.2.3 Two-Stage, Semi-parametric Approach
In the two-stage approach, cost efficiency scores, estimated in the first stage using DEA, are
regressed, in the second stage, on environmental variables to investigate the dependency of
hospital efficiency on such explanatory variables. In health care applications of the two-stage
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approach, the tobit (censored) model has been a popular analytical technique used in the second
stage. Simar and Wilson [2], however, criticized previous two-stage studies because of the
failure to define a coherent statistical model consistent with the second stage analysis.
Additionally, they argue that inference in the previous two-stage studies is invalid because of the
failure to account for the serial correlation present among efficiency estimates. Simar and
Wilson [2] defined a statistical model consistent with the second stage analysis which requires a
truncated regression in the second stage. Further, they suggested a bootstrap procedure to
provide valid inference about the effects of explanatory variables on estimated efficiency in the
second stage truncated regression.
In the second stage, I specify the following truncated regression model:

0 < δˆ j = z j β + ε j ≤ 1 ,

j = 1, 2, …., n

(3)

where δˆ j is DEA estimated cost efficiency score of the j-th hospital, εj is assumed to be
distributed N(0, σ2) with left truncation at − z j β and right truncation at 1 − z j β , z j is a vector of

k environmental variables which are thought to affect hospital efficiency, and β is a vector of
parameters to be estimated. It has been shown that the DEA efficiency estimates used as the
dependent variable in the second stage regression are serially correlated [2]. While this
correlation disappears asymptotically, Simar and Wilson [2] showed that conventional methods
for inference in the second stage regression are invalid. To provide valid inference in the second
stage analysis, they suggested a bootstrap algorithm which is a parametric bootstrap of the
truncated regression. Here, I use their Algorithm 1 bootstrap procedure, modified for lower and
upper bounds of DEA cost efficiency scores, which has the following steps:
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1. Estimate the truncated regression 0 < δˆ j = z j β + ε j ≤ 1 using the m < n observations
where δˆ j < 1 (j = 1,.…, m), to obtain an estimate β̂ of β.
2. Loop over the next three steps L = 2000 times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates

{ }

Β = βˆ *

i.

L

b =1

:

For each j = 1,…., m, draw εj from N(0, σ̂ 2 ) with left truncation at − z j βˆ and right

truncation at 1 − z j β̂ .
ii.

For each j = 1,….., m compute δ *j = z j βˆ + ε j .

iii.

Estimate the truncated regression of δ *j on z j yielding estimates β̂ * .

3. Use the bootstrap values in B and the original estimates of β̂ to construct percentile
confidence intervals for each element of β.
3.2.4 Stochastic Frontier Analysis

Alternatively, hospital cost efficiency can be estimated using SFA which, in a general form,
specifies total cost as a function of outputs and input prices plus a composite error term [11]:

TC j = f ( y j , w j ) + ε j ,

(4)

and ε j = v j + u j , j = 1, 2, …., n
where TCj represents the total cost of the j-th hospital, yj is a vector of outputs, wj is a vector of
input prices, and εj is a composite error term. εj is decomposed as random statistical noise vj,
assumed normally distributed, plus cost inefficiency uj for which a distribution must also be
assumed.2 Additionally, one must also specify a functional form for the cost equation. The most
2

Distributions generally assumed for the inefficiency error term are: half-normal, truncated-normal, exponential and
gamma.
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popular functional forms used in empirical research have been the translog and Cobb-Douglas
cost functions. Given the distributional assumptions for the two error terms, the model is
estimated by maximum likelihood [11].
In SFA, the impact of environmental variables on the cost inefficiency is specified as:

uˆ j = z j β + η j , j = 1, 2, …., n

(5)

where û j is the SFA estimated cost inefficiency, zj is the vector of environmental variables, β is
a vector of parameters to be estimated and ηj is a random variable defined by the truncation of
the normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2. The stochastic frontier cost model used
in this study allows cost inefficiency to be explicitly modeled as a function of environmental
variables, the parameters of which are estimated simultaneously with the stochastic frontier cost
function in a one-stage procedure [11].
3.3 Data

In this study, we use data from the 2005 and 2006 American Hospital Association (AHA)
Annual Survey of Hospitals, the Area Resource File, the Medicare Hospital Cost Report, and the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Hospital Compare public reporting database
for hospital quality measures. The analyzed sample consists of CAH rural hospitals and nonconverting, PPS rural hospitals. Following Stensland, Davidson, and Moscovice [12], we restrict
the PPS rural hospitals to those with no more than fifty beds, allowing us to have two groups of
rural hospitals of similar size. While CAHs are restricted to no more than 25 acute care beds,
they have no restrictions on long-term care beds such as skilled nursing home beds; the mean for
CAHs’ total staffed and licensed beds in our sample was 36 while for non-converting rural
hospitals was 38 (Table 3.2).
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One of the goals of the CAH Program has been to improve the quality of care provided
by CAHs. To control for the quality of care, we follow Nayar and Ozcan [13] and use quality
measures publicly available from the CMS Hospital Compare database. For this study, only two
quality measures reflecting recommended treatments for pneumonia are selected because of a
large number of missing observations on the other quality measures. Additionally, only those
hospitals for which quality measures were calculated based on at least 25 patients (consistent
with CMS recommendations) are used in the analysis, further reducing the sample size. The two
quality measures used in this study are: (1) percent of patients given pneumococcal vaccination,
i.e., pneumonia patients age 65 and older who were screened for pneumococcal vaccine status
and were administered the vaccine prior to discharge, if indicated; (2) percent of patients given
initial antibiotic timing, i.e., pneumonia patients given initial antibiotic within four hours after
arrival. Casey et al. [14] found these to be relevant quality measures for CAHs. The data sample
consists of 331 rural hospitals in 2005 (of which 178 were rural CAHs), and 429 in 2006 (of
which 224 were rural CAHs).3
For the specification of the stochastic frontier cost function, we followed previous
literature [9,15]. Specifically, we used total hospital expenses (exptot) as the dependent variable,
and input prices, hospital outputs, and product mix descriptors as explanatory variables. Hospital
outputs consist of outpatient visits (opv), admissions (admtot), and post-admission days
(postdays) (inpatient days – admissions). Consistent with previous literature, we control for
hospital output heterogeneity using product mix descriptors (PMD): percent of emergency room
visits (erv%) ((emergency room visits / outpatient visits) × 100), percent of outpatient surgeries
(outsurg%) ((outpatient surgeries / outpatient visits) × 100) and percent of births (birth%)
3

For consistency, CAHs located in metropolitan statistical areas were eliminated from the analysis.
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((births / admissions) × 100). Additionally, we control for quality of care using percent of
patients given pneumococcal vaccination (pneum_vac%) and percent of patients given initial
antibiotic timing (initial_antib%). We also include the number of hospital beds as a proxy for
fixed costs in the cost function. Input prices used in the analysis are: the price of labor (w) (sum
of payroll expenses and employee benefits divided by the full-time equivalent facility personnel)
and the price of capital (pk) (sum of depreciation expenses and interest expenses divided by the
number of facility beds) [15]. The assumption of linear homogeneity in input prices is imposed
by normalizing the cost equation by the price of labor.
The DEA cost model requires information on hospital outputs, inputs, and input prices
[16]. For consistency, we used the same hospital outputs and input prices as in the stochastic
frontier cost function. However, the product mix descriptors used in the SFA are included as
actual outputs in the DEA model. Specifically, we used the following hospital outputs in our
DEA model: outpatient visits, admissions, post-admission days, emergency room visits,
outpatient surgeries, and births. Consistent with previous literature, we used the two quality
measures as additional outputs in the DEA model [13]. The physical inputs consist of full time
equivalent (FTE) facility personnel and total staffed and licensed hospital beds, and the
corresponding input prices are identical to the ones in the SFA (the price of labor and the price
of capital) (see Table 3.1 for the specifications of DEA and SFA models).
A particular challenge in this study is adjusting outputs to control for case-mix variations.
Unfortunately, there is no Medicare Case-Mix Index available for CAHs as these hospitals are
exempted from the PPS system that reports case-mix data. In the stochastic frontier cost
function, percent of emergency room visits, percent of outpatient surgeries and percent of births
are used to control for heterogeneity in hospital outputs [17].
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Table 3.1. Variable definitions and model specifications.
Variable

Variable Definition

Outputs
admtot
Total hospital admissions
postdays
Post-admission days
opv
Total outpatient visits
erv
Emergency room visits
outsurg
Outpatient surgeries
births
Total births
Product Mix Descriptors (PMD)
erv%
% Emergency room visits
outsurg%
% Outpatient surgeries
birth%
% Admissions for birth
Quality Indicators
pneum_vac%
%Patients given pneumococcal vaccination
initial_antib%
%Patients given initial antibiotic timing
Inputs
bdtot
Total staffed and licensed hospital beds
fte
Full time equivalent (FTE) employee
Input Prices
pk
$ Price of capital
w
$ Price of labor
exptot
$ Total hospital expenditure
Environmental Variables
Government
For-profit
Medicare%
Medicaid%
HHI
System
MHMO%
CAH
Income

Government hospital (1,0)
For-profit hospital (1,0)
% Medicare admissions
% Medicaid admissions
Herfindahl-Hirschman index
Member of a multihospital system (1,0)
% Medicare HMO penetration
CAH hospital (0,1)
Median household income
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DEA

SFA

Output
Output
Output
Output
Output
Output

Output
Output
Output

PMD
PMD
PMD
Quality Output
Quality Output

Quality Measure
Quality Measure

Input
Input

Fixed Input

Input Price
Input Price

Input Price
Input Price
Total Cost

Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable

Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable
Env. Variable

Ozgen and Ozcan [18] noted that the lack of case-mix variables in DEA efficiency
models is in part compensated by the specification of multiple outputs. In the DEA model, we
expand the set of outputs (beyond the ones used in SFA) in order to capture case-mix differences
by including emergency room visits, outpatient surgeries, and births.
The set of environmental variables used to explain cost efficiency, on which we focus in
this analysis, is identical for both SFA and the second stage regression in the two-stage approach.
For the specification of environmental variables, we follow Rosko and Mutter [9,17]. The
primary variable of interest is a CAH dummy (one if the hospital has CAH status and zero
otherwise) which is used to test whether CAHs are more or less cost efficient than nonconverting, PPS rural hospitals. Dummy variables that define government hospitals
(Government) and for-profit hospitals (For-profit) are included to control for internal pressure
for efficiency associated with ownership. Non-profit ownership is the reference category. Forprofit hospitals are expected to be more cost efficient than non-profit and government hospitals
because their profit-maximization objective provides a strong incentive for cost reduction and
efficiency improvement. Membership in a multihospital system (System), which is also
introduced as a dummy variable, is also expected to be directly associated with hospital
efficiency because hospital system membership has been shown to provide significant cost
advantages [17].
Two variables are used to control for external pressure for efficiency associated with
public payers: Medicare percent of admissions (Medicare%) ((Medicare admissions/total
admissions)×100) and Medicaid percent of admissions (Medicaid%) ((Medicaid admissions/
total admissions)×100). The effect of Medicare% on hospital cost efficiency is not clear given
the joint use in estimation of the two groups of rural hospitals with different reimbursement
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systems: cost-based reimbursed CAHs and PPS rural hospitals. Medicaid, on the other hand,
typically underpays hospitals and exerts cost containment pressure and, thus, Medicaid% is
expected to be directly associated with hospital cost efficiency.
Table 3.2. Summary statistics of variables.
CAH
Variable

Rural

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

admtot
postdays
opv
erv
outsurg
births
pneum_vac%
initial_antib%
bdtot
fte
pk
w
exptot
erv%
outsurg%
birth%
Environmental Variables

1,072.12
6,296.83
42,104.53
6,981.46
889.98
97.53
62.31
84.74
35.92
191.95
36,824.86
50,747.63
1.80E+07
20.60
2.60
7.91

427.87
6,769.26
30,384.28
4,516.93
721.07
109.61
23.66
8.75
22.27
79.35
29,993.99
13,418.28
9.31E+06
13.52
2.41
7.90

1,730.83
4,535.68
45,033.72
9,492.27
1,175.71
202.41
59.90
80.87
37.93
216.16
35,780.83
49,177.05
2.08E+07
26.49
3.41
10.86

737.84
2,024.08
33,299.60
5,194.94
885.10
213.33
24.28
10.40
9.41
98.51
27,633.52
12,514.33
1.20E+07
16.71
3.59
10.21

Government
For-profit
Medicare%
Medicaid%
HHI
System
MHMO%
Income

0.32
0.03
59.90
13.05
0.50
0.42
3.26
38,432.78

0.47
0.18
12.57
7.98
0.35
0.49
5.31
6,190.83

0.34
0.14
52.47
17.37
0.56
0.51
2.64
37,391.59

0.47
0.35
11.77
9.65
0.33
0.50
4.76
8,465.68
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A Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is used to control for competitive pressure in a
hospital’s market, which is defined as the county. HHI is calculated by summing the squares of
the market shares of admissions for all of the hospitals in the county and takes a value between 0
and 1, with values approaching 1 indicating less competitive pressures. Another source of
external pressure for efficiency is Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) penetration. We
used percent of Medicare HMO penetration (MHMO%) from the Area Resource File as a proxy
for general HMO penetration [9]. Median household income of the county (Income) and a
dummy variable for 2006 to control for time effects are also included as environmental variables
to explain hospital efficiency.
Summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis are presented for both
CAHs and the PPS rural hospitals in Table 3.2.
3.4 Results

We started the empirical analysis by performing a series of likelihood ratio tests to arrive at an
appropriate specification of the SFA model. Based on the results of these tests, we adopted a
SFA cost model with a translog functional form and a half-normal distribution for the
inefficiency error term. The results of the SFA translog cost function are presented in the
Appendix 2 (Table A.3.6), together with the likelihood ratio tests performed for the SFA model.
Table 3.3 shows summary statistics of cost efficiency scores estimated by both DEA and
the SFA with the two years of data jointly. We present the reciprocal of SFA cost inefficiency
scores. The mean cost efficiency of all rural hospitals estimated using DEA without quality
measures was 63.3%, increasing to 70% when quality measures were included. Similarly, the
mean cost efficiency estimated using SFA increased from 70.2% to 78.3% after inclusion of the
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quality measures. Mutter et al. [6] indicate that if quality is not controlled for in hospital
efficiency estimation, it will show up as inefficiency. Our results confirm their statement.
The DEA estimated mean cost efficiency (Table 3.3) for CAHs is 67.9% while for the
comparison group of non-converting, PPS rural hospitals is 72.4%, indicating that CAHs are less
cost efficient. The mean cost efficiency estimated using SFA is 75.1% for CAHs and 81.8% for
non-converting rural hospitals, also indicating that CAHs are less cost efficient. As expected,
there is a significant difference in the magnitude of efficiency scores estimated by DEA and
SFA, which is attributed in principal to the differences in how the two methods account for
statistical noise.
3.4.1 Density Analysis of DEA Cost Inefficiency Scores

Figure 3.1 shows the densities of DEA estimated cost inefficiency scores of CAHs and nonconverting, PPS rural hospitals in each year (a) as well as with the two years jointly used (b).
Consistent with the original Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) test, we use the reciprocal of cost
efficiency scores (cost inefficiency ≥ 1) for kernel density estimation. In Figure 3.1(a), we
observe a rightward shift from the efficient unity of the densities of cost inefficiency scores of
CAHs relative to those of non-converting rural hospitals in 2005 and 2006 (a), suggesting that
CAHs tend to be more cost inefficient than non-converting rural hospitals in both years. Figure
3.1(b) shows the densities of cost inefficiency scores of CAHs and non-converting rural hospitals
with pooled data. Again, we observe a rightward shift of CAHs’ density relative to the one for
the PPS rural hospitals, suggesting that CAHs are more cost inefficient than the PPS rural
hospitals. These findings are also supported by the Simar-Zelenyuk test (Table 3.4) which
rejected the null hypotheses on equality of densities between CAHs and PPS rural hospitals.
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Table 3.3. Summary statistics of DEA and SFA estimated cost efficiency.
DEA
Year
CAH2005
CAH2006
Rural2005
Rural2006
CAH
Rural
All

SFA

N

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

178
224
153
205
402
358
760

0.678
0.679
0.720
0.727
0.679
0.724
0.700

0.184
0.181
0.163
0.171
0.182
0.167
0.177

0.792
0.719
0.864
0.784
0.751
0.818
0.783

0.034
0.034
0.038
0.035
0.050
0.054
0.062

Table 3.4. Simar-Zelenyuk test on equality of densities of DEA cost inefficiency scores.
Null Hypothesis

Test

*p-value

f(CAH06)=f(Rural06)
4.13
0.002
f(CAH05)=f(Rural05)
3.76
0.001
f(CAH)=f(Rural)
6.35
0.000
Notes: *Bootstrap p-value. The number of bootstrap iterations is 2000. All calculations are done by authors in
Matlab adopting from programs written for Simar and Zelenyuk [1].

3.4.2 Marginal Effects of Environmental Variables

Table 3.5 presents the results of three different approaches to estimate the marginal effects of
environmental variables: the DEA two-stage approach with a traditional tobit model, as well as
with a bootstrapped truncated regression along the line of Simar and Wilson [2] (for which 99%
and 95% bootstrap confidence intervals are shown), and SFA. For tobit and bootstrapped
truncated regression models, the dependent variable is DEA cost efficiency; therefore a positive
(negative) coefficient suggests a positive (negative) effect on cost efficiency. For SFA, the
dependent variable is cost inefficiency, where a positive coefficient implies decreased efficiency.
It should be noted that except for the insignificant Medicaid variable, all variables were
consistent in sign – all variables that were negative in the DEA bootstrapped truncated regression
were positive in the SFA cost inefficiency equation and vice versa.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 3.1. Kernel estimated densities of DEA cost inefficiency scores of CAHs and nonconverting rural hospitals: (a) 2005 – 2006, and (b) pooled data)
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The results show that the coefficient of our key variable, the CAH dummy, is positive
and highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.01) in the SFA model. This suggests that CAHs
are more cost inefficient than non-converting, PPS rural hospitals. An interpretation of this
coefficient is that, after controlling for other factors, CAHs are 7.3% more cost inefficient than
non-converting rural hospitals. This is similar to the difference of 6.7% in mean group cost
efficiency estimated by SFA (Table 3.3). The marginal effect of the CAH dummy variable on
cost efficiency is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in the bootstrapped
truncated regression, suggesting that CAHs are 5.2% less cost efficient than non-converting rural
hospitals. This is also similar to the difference of 4.5% in mean group cost efficiency estimated
by DEA (Table 3.3). In the tobit model, the same coefficient is negative but statistically
insignificant (or significant only at the 10% level) and only half the size of the CAH coefficient
in the bootstrapped truncated regression. While these results support our hypothesis that CAHs
are less cost efficient than non-converting, PPS rural hospitals because of the differences in
Medicare reimbursement facing these two groups of rural hospitals, they also show how results
of the tobit model in this case may lead to an alternative interpretation.
The estimated results show a positive and statistically significant coefficient of
government ownership in the SFA model, suggesting that government owned rural hospitals are
more cost inefficient than nonprofit rural hospitals, a result that is consistent with previous
literature [9]. In the two-stage approach, the effect of government ownership on hospital cost
efficiency is negative but significant only in the tobit model. For-profit ownership, on the other
hand, was not found to impact efficiency in any of the three models.
The share of Medicare admissions has a negative and significant coefficient in both tobit
and bootstrapped truncated regression models, suggesting that an increase in Medicare
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admissions is inversely associated with hospital efficiency. Similar to Rosko and Mutter [9], the
coefficient of Herfindahl-Hirschman index is positive and significant only in the SFA model,
suggesting that an increase in HHI (or a decrease in market competition) is directly associated
with hospital cost inefficiency. This is also consistent with the concept of price-based
competition which suggests that if competition is increased, hospitals will compete for patients
by reducing costs [17].
The positive and significant coefficient of system membership found in the tobit and
bootstrapped truncated regression models suggests that rural hospitals that are members of a
multihospital system are more cost efficient than the ones that are not. System membership has
been shown to improve hospital performance because hospital systems can take advantage of
economies of scale and eliminate duplicative administrative functions [17].
The negative and significant coefficient of Medicare HMO found in the SFA model
suggests that HMO penetration creates pressure for rural hospitals to reduce cost inefficiency, a
result consistent with previous literature [9]. Finally, the positive and significant coefficient of
the county median household income in the SFA model suggests a direct relationship between
this variable and hospital cost inefficiency [9].
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions

This study compared efficiencies of two groups of rural hospitals operating under different
Medicare reimbursement systems. Cost efficiency scores were estimated using two different
frontier methods: DEA and SFA. Comparisons of mean cost efficiencies between cost-based
reimbursed CAH rural hospitals and non-converting, PPS rural hospitals revealed that CAHs
were less cost efficient than non-converting rural hospitals. I found that CAHs were, on average,
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Table 3.5. Estimated effects of environmental variables on cost efficiency/inefficiency.
Tobit Regression
Cost Efficiency
Variable
Constant
CAH
Government
For-profit
Medicare%
Medicaid%
HHI
System
Income
MHMO%
Y2006

β
0.8522**
-0.0271
-0.0384*
0.0180
-0.0017*
-0.0006
-0.0059
0.0481**
-8.35E-07
-0.0008
0.0123

t-stat
11.05
-1.77
-2.38
0.65
-2.38
-0.56
-0.28
3.11
-0.77
-0.58
0.82

β
0.8138**
-0.0524**
-0.0152
0.0249
-0.0015*
-0.0005
-0.0157
0.0432**
-1.34E-06
0.0016
0.0011

Bootstrapped Truncated Regression
Cost Efficiency
99% Bootstrap C.I.
95% Bootstrap C.I.
LB
UB
LB
UB
0.6569
0.9712
0.6943
0.9322
-0.0843
-0.0214
-0.0768
-0.0287
-0.0474
0.0178
-0.0390
0.0099
-0.0385
0.0829
-0.0219
0.0686
-0.0030
0.0000
-0.0026
-0.0003
-0.0026
0.0016
-0.0021
0.0011
-0.0573
0.0234
-0.0474
0.0158
0.0129
0.0730
0.0196
0.0664
-3.54E-06
7.95E-07
-3.05E-06
2.80E-07
-0.0013
0.0045
-0.0006
0.0038
-0.0286
0.0301
-0.0219
0.0235

SFA
Cost Inefficiency
β
0.0058
0.0732**
0.0285**
-0.0040
0.0009
-0.0019
0.0541**
-0.0169
2.99E-06**
-0.0035*
0.0856

t-stat
0.01
11.90
22.52
-0.17
1.83
-1.93
2.75
-0.95
2.85
-2.23
0.90

Notes: ** and * denote significance at 1% and 5% levels. Estimation of bootstrapped truncated regression is based on Algorithm 1 of Simar and Wilson (2007),
modified for left and right truncations, with 2000 bootstrap replications for confidence intervals. The dependent variable in tobit and bootstrapped truncated
regression models is cost efficiency while in SFA model is cost inefficiency.
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4.5% less cost efficient than non-converting rural hospitals in the DEA model while the results of
the SFA model showed that CAHs were, on average, 6.7% less cost efficient than nonconverting rural hospitals. Using SFA, Rosko and Mutter [9] found that CAHs were 5.6% less
cost efficient than non-converting rural hospitals. Additionally, the densities of DEA cost
inefficiency scores were estimated and compared using a nonparametric kernel density estimator
and a bootstrap-based test suggested by Simar and Zelenyuk [1]. The results of Simar-Zelenyuk
test and density analysis of DEA cost inefficiency scores also showed that CAHs were less cost
efficient than non-converting rural hospitals.
An alternative approach employed to analyze the effect of Medicare reimbursement
system on rural hospital cost efficiency was incorporated by using a CAH dummy and estimating
its marginal effect using SFA as well as the two-stage DEA approach. By now, it is well
established in the literature how to use SFA to make valid inferences about the effects of
environmental variables on estimated cost inefficiency [11]. The two-stage approach, in which
efficiency scores estimated in the first stage by DEA are regressed in the second stage on
environmental variables, has been popular in the efficiency analysis literature. Many of the
previous studies used a tobit model in the second stage. However, Simar and Wilson [2]
criticized previous applications of the two-stage stage approach, mainly because of the failure to
account for the correlation present among efficiency estimates and the use of tobit in the secondstage analysis. They defined an alternative statistical model where the truncated regression with
bootstrap leads to consistent estimation in the second stage analysis.
In this study, we estimated the marginal effects of environmental variables (CAH status,
ownership, Medicare and Medicaid, etc.) on hospital cost efficiency using SFA and the two-stage
DEA approach with tobit as well as with the bootstrapped truncated regression suggested by
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Simar and Wilson [2]. Our key variable, the CAH dummy, had strongly statistically significant
coefficients in the bootstrapped truncated regression and SFA models, suggesting that CAHs
were between 5% and 7% less cost efficient than non-converting rural hospitals. These results
are consistent with our mean group efficiencies estimated by DEA and SFA where we find
similar differences between mean cost efficiencies of CAHs and non-converting rural hospitals.
In contrast, the coefficient of the CAH variable was insignificant in the tobit model.
It should be noted that this research has some limitations. In particular, this study cannot
be truly considered a policy analysis of the CAH Program because it does not perform a “before”
and “after” analysis, nor does it examine the total benefits and the total costs of the CAH
Program. An additional concern arises from the fact that CAH conversion is not random because
hospitals choose to convert and any comparison group will differ from converting hospitals [19].
It is possible that our conclusion that CAHs are less cost efficient than non-converting rural
hospitals could be driven by more inefficient hospitals choosing to convert to CAH status.
However, our results are supported by similar findings in the literature and by historical evidence
which indicate that the PPS reimbursement results in greater cost containment and improved
efficiency [9].
Our research suggests that SFA and the two-stage DEA approach along the line of Simar
and Wilson [2] are viable alternatives for analyzing the impact of environmental variables on
hospital cost efficiency. We found that both the SFA and two-stage approach generated mostly
similar and consistent results in our empirical application of the two methods to the efficiency
analysis of rural hospitals. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages that one needs to
be aware of. In particular, when using the two-stage DEA approach, researchers should consider
using the bootstrap algorithm proposed by Simar and Wilson [2] for making valid inference.
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Researchers should also consider using both methods, wherever possible, as a robustness check
of the impact of environmental variables on estimated efficiency.
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CHAPTER 4
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY OF CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITALS: AN APPLICATION
OF THE TWO-STAGE APPROACH WITH DOUBLE BOOTSTRAP1
4.1 Introduction
The Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Program, introduced by the Rural Hospital Flexibility
(Flex) Program, represents a subset of mostly rural hospitals that receive special cost-based
reimbursement for treating Medicare patients. Starting in 1997, the program has allowed for
more than 1,300 hospitals to convert to CAH status in exchange for accepting some
restrictions. Most importantly, CAH conversion requires hospitals to be at least 35 miles by
primary road, or 15 miles by secondary road, from the nearest hospital,2 have no more than
25 acute care beds, and maintain an annual average length of in-patient stay of 96 hours or
less.
Medicare has paid CAHs on a cost basis rather than prospective payment system
(PPS)3 in order to protect these financially vulnerable hospitals that are important for access
to care in isolated rural areas [2]. A low patient volume has made it difficult for small rural
hospitals to recover their Medicare costs under the PPS [1]. The CAH Program has increased
Medicare payments to converting hospitals to improve their financial viability and potentially
prevent hospital closure. While it is widely believed that the CAH Program has maintained
access to care in remote regions, concerns have been raised about the effect of Medicare
reimbursement on the efficiency of CAHs [1]. In particular, cost-based reimbursement −
which was used by Medicare to reimburse hospitals before 1983 – provided an incentive for

1

This chapter has been accepted for publication in Health Care Management Science. Authorization from
publisher, Springer, for reproduction can be found in Appendix 4. The final publication is available at
www.springerlink.com (DOI 10.1007/s10729-012-9209-8).
2
Before January 2006, states were allowed to waive the distance requirement for hospitals that were declared
“necessary providers” and qualify them for CAH conversion. Thus, some CAHs are quite close to other
hospitals. For a detailed description of the CAH Program, see [1].
3
The PPS pays a fixed price per case based on the diagnosis-related group (DRG), constraining hospitals to
keep their unit costs bellow the PPS rates in order to remain financially viable.
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hospitals to increase costs (i.e., oversupply services and/or overuse resources) in order to
receive higher revenues because Medicare paid on a cost basis [3-4].
In a recent article, Rosko and Mutter [5] examined cost inefficiency differences
between CAH and non-CAH rural hospitals using stochastic frontier analysis. They found
that, on average, CAHs were more cost inefficient than non-CAH rural hospitals and that
there was a positive association between the number of years in the CAH Program and cost
inefficiency. However, by jointly using CAH and non-CAH rural hospitals in their analysis,
they were unable to isolate the marginal effects of Medicare and Medicaid patient mix on
CAHs’ efficiency. Cost-based reimbursement has been the primary factor driving CAH
conversion and the effects of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement on the efficiency of
CAHs may be of interest for policy makers.
In light of the above discussion, the question that arises is: among those hospitals that
have already converted to CAH status, does an increased Medicare patient mix have a
negative effect on the technical efficiency of CAHs? That is, if cost-based reimbursement
creates a disincentive for hospitals to operate efficiently, would we expect to see CAH
hospitals with a higher proportion of Medicare cost-based reimbursement patients have
greater decreases in technical efficiency?
In this paper, we seek to answer to this question by focusing on the CAH certified
rural hospitals and using recent methodological advancements in efficiency analysis.
Specifically, we use a two-stage, semi-parametric approach and bootstrap procedures
proposed by Simar and Wilson [6] to estimate technical efficiency scores and make valid
inferences about the impact of environmental variables (i.e., Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement, hospital ownership, market competition) on CAHs’ efficiency.
In the two-stage approach, technical efficiency scores, estimated in the first stage
using data envelopment analysis (DEA), are regressed, in the second stage, on environmental
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variables to investigate their effects on efficiency. A firm (CAH in our case) is technically
efficient if it produces its outputs using minimum input quantities [7]. DEA measures
efficiency of a firm relative to a nonparametric estimate of the best-practice (efficient)
frontier constructed from the most efficient firms. We assess technical efficiency of CAHs in
2005 and 2006, controlling for quality using measures (publicly available) as additional
outputs in the DEA model [8-9].
The two-stage approach has been a popular technique for efficiency analysis. In an
influential paper, however, Simar and Wilson [6] criticized previous applications of the twostage approach because of the failure to account for the correlation present among efficiency
estimates. They show that the DEA efficiency scores are serially correlated and inference in
the second stage regression is invalid based on standard methods. The correlation arises in
finite samples because the efficiency score of a firm is estimated relative to the efficiencies of
peer firms lying on the frontier. Simar and Wilson [6] defined a statistical model where a
truncated regression with a parametric bootstrap procedure (Algorithm #1) allows for valid
inference in the second stage analysis.
An additional problem arises from the fact that the DEA efficiency estimator is
biased by construction; however, it is a consistent estimator [10]. In order to account for both
the bias and serial correlation of efficiency scores, Simar and Wilson [6] developed the so
called double bootstrap procedure (Algorithm #2). In the double bootstrap procedure, the
DEA efficiency estimator is corrected for bias, in the first stage, using a specific bootstrap
procedure. In the second stage, bias-corrected efficiency scores are regressed on
environmental variables using a second, parametric bootstrap procedure applied to the
truncated regression. Although the methodology proposed by Simar and Wilson [6] has
become an important approach for efficiency analysis (see, for example, Zelenyuk and Zheka
[11], and Demchuk and Zelenyuk [12] for empirical applications), we are unaware of any
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study that has applied the double bootstrap procedure to analyze efficiency in the U.S.
hospital industry. In this study, we use both bootstrap algorithms of Simar and Wilson [6] to
investigate how the technical efficiency of CAHs is influenced by environmental variables, in
particular Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.
4.2 Literature Review
Since its creation, there has been a growing interest in evaluating the performance of the
CAH Program. Previous research focused almost exclusively on evaluating financial
performance and quality of care of CAHs. Using Medicare Cost Report data, Pink et al. [13]
developed comparative financial indicators for CAHs. Based on these financial indicators,
Pink et al. [14] found significant differences in financial performance among CAH peer
groups. MedPAC [1] reported hospitals that converted to CAH status dramatically increased
their Medicare payments and improved their all-payer profit margins between 1998 and 2003.
Using an eight-year panel of 89 rural hospitals in Iowa, Li et al. [15] found that hospitals that
converted to CAH status significantly increased their operating revenues, expenses, and
margins. Li et al. [16] examined the impact of CAH conversion on hospital patient safety and
found that CAH conversion was associated with improved performance of certain Patient
Safety Indicators. Analyzing quality improvements in CAHs, Casey and Moscovice [17]
found that Medicare cost-based reimbursement allowed CAHs to fund additional staff, staff
training, and equipment to improve patient care. Rosko and Mutter [5] compared the cost
inefficiency of CAHs with that of prospectively paid rural hospitals using stochastic frontier
analysis and found that CAHs were, on average, more cost inefficient.
The contribution of our paper to the literature is twofold. First, through focusing
solely on the CAH hospital subset, we examine the effect of Medicare cost-based
reimbursement on the technical efficiency of CAHs. The second contribution is the
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application of recent methodological advancements to hospital efficiency analysis, namely
the two-stage approach with bootstrap procedures suggested by Simar and Wilson [6].
4.3 Data
Data used in this study come from the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey
of Hospitals, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Hospital Compare
public reporting database for hospital quality measures, and from the Area Resource File.4
We focus on the set of community, general rural hospitals in the U.S. classified as Critical
Access Hospitals. For the purpose of this study, we used data on CAH rural hospitals in 2005
and 2006.
4.3.1 DEA Variables
The choice of outputs and inputs used in the DEA model was guided by previous literature
[5,9]. Specifically, we used as hospital outputs the number of outpatient visits, the number of
admissions, post-admission days (inpatient days – admissions), emergency room visits,
outpatient surgeries, and total births (Table 4.1). The inputs used for DEA efficiency
estimation consists of labor and capital inputs. The labor inputs are full time equivalent
(FTE) registered nurses, FTE licensed practical nurses, and other FTEs, while the capital
input is represented by total staffed and licensed hospital beds [9].
To control for the quality of care, we follow Nayar and Ozcan [8] and use quality
measures publicly available from the CMS Hospital Compare database. Although the
Hospital Compare database provides quality measures reflecting recommended treatments for
acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure, and pneumonia, only quality measures for

4

AHA data can be obtained from http://www.ahadataviewer.com/book-cd-products/AHA-Survey/, Area
Resource File data from http://www.arf.hrsa.gov, and Hospital Compare quality data from
http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov.
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pneumonia were selected for this study because there were too many missing observations for
AMI and heart failure. Unfortunately, the proportion of CAHs reporting quality information
in 2005 and 2006 was low. CAHs voluntarily report quality measures to Hospital Compare
and they do not have the financial incentives of PPS hospitals to consistently report quality
information to CMS. Additionally, only those hospitals for which quality measures were
calculated based on at least 25 patients (consistent with CMS recommendations) were used in
the analysis, which further reduced the sample size. Two quality measures are used in this
study: (1) percent of patients given pneumococcal vaccination (i.e., pneumonia patients age
65 and older who were screened for pneumococcal vaccine status and were administered the
vaccine prior to discharge, if indicated), and (2) percent of patients given initial antibiotic
timing (i.e., pneumonia patients given initial antibiotic within four hours after arrival). The
data sample consists of 186 rural CAHs in 2005 and 229 rural CAHs in 2006.
A particular challenge in this study is adjusting outputs to control for case-mix
variations. Unfortunately, there is no Medicare Case-Mix Index available for CAHs as these
hospitals are exempted from the PPS system. Ozgen and Ozcan [18] and others noted that
the lack of case-mix variables in DEA efficiency models is in part compensated by
specification of multiple outputs. In this study, the vector of outputs was expanded beyond
the usual inpatient and outpatient outputs used in hospital efficiency studies by including
emergency room visits, outpatient surgeries, and births as case-mix controls.
4.3.2 Environmental Variables
The specification of environmental variables used in the second stage regression (Table 4.1)
follows recent literature on hospital efficiency. Rosko and Mutter [19] broadly classify these
variables as internal factors (ownership status and system membership) and external factors
(public payment policy, hospital competition, and health maintenance organization
penetration).
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Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables.
DEA Variables

Mean

Outputs
Hospital admissions
Post-admission days
Outpatient visits
Emergency room visits
Outpatient surgeries
Births
Quality Measures
Patients given pneumococcal vaccination (%)
Patients given initial antibiotic timing (%)
Inputs
Total staffed and licensed hospital beds
Full time equivalent (FTE) registered nurses
FTE licensed practical nurses
Other FTEs
Environmental Variables
Government
For-profit
Medicare
Medicaid
HHI
System
MHMO
Income

Variable Definition
Government hospital (binary variable 1,0)
For-profit hospital (binary variable 1,0)
% Medicare admissions
% Medicaid admissions
Herfindahl-Hirschman index
Multihospital system (binary variable 1,0)
% Medicare HMO penetration
Median household income

Std. Dev.

1,069.41
6,274.87
41,773.94
6,974.06
885.82
96.07

428.29
6,737.47
30,092.56
4,474.27
712.13
108.97

61.90
84.61

23.65
8.68

36.08
40.38
9.02
122.78

22.21
19.63
6.62
56.64

0.32
0.03
59.93
12.98
0.50
0.42
3.32
38,360.79

12.64
7.90
0.35
5.29
6,218.81

Binary variables that define government and for-profit hospitals, with non-profit
hospitals as the reference category, are used to control for the internal pressure for efficiency
associated with ownership [5,19]. One line of thought in the theoretical literature indicates
that the effect of ownership on hospital efficiency should be consistent with property rights
theory (PRT) which argues that when property rights are not clearly specified, incentives
decline that promote efficient behavior. Based on PRT, we would expect that for-profit
hospitals will place a greater emphasis on increasing efficiency than non-profit and
government hospitals. However, the empirical literature that examined the impact of
ownership on hospital efficiency reported mixed findings. Using DEA, several studies found
that non-profit hospitals are more efficient than for-profit hospitals [20] or for-profit hospitals
are more efficient than non-profit ones [21]. Another internal factor that has been associated
with hospital efficiency is membership in a multihospital system.
72

Previous studies showed that the external financial pressure from Medicare and
Medicaid is a key factor affecting hospital efficiency [19]. While variables representing
shares of revenue from Medicare and Medicaid would be desirable to control for external
pressure for efficiency of public payers, such measures are not available. Instead, we follow
previous literature [5,19] and use proxies such as Medicare percent of admissions ((Medicare
admissions / total admissions) × 100) and Medicaid percent of admissions ((Medicaid
admissions / total admissions) × 100). The rationale for the Medicare cost-based
reimbursement of CAHs has been to improve the financial situation of many of the small
rural hospitals that were unable to cover their costs under the PPS. Cost-based
reimbursement, however, has been related with inefficiency in hospital operations [3-4].
Since CAHs receive Medicare cost-based reimbursement, we want to test whether Medicare
percent of admissions (a proxy for Medicare reimbursement) is inversely associated with
CAHs’ technical efficiency. It has also been shown that Medicaid typically underpays
hospitals and exerts cost containment pressures irrespective of the payment system [19].
Therefore, Medicaid percent of admissions is expected to be directly associated with CAHs’
technical efficiency.
We use a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to control for competitive pressure in a
hospital’s market at the county level (consistent with previous studies). HHI is calculated by
summing the squares of the market shares of admissions for all of the hospitals in the county
[22] and it takes a value between 0 and 1, with values of HHI approaching 1 indicating less
competitive pressure. Recent research showed an inverse relationship between HHI and
hospital efficiency [5].
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) penetration constitutes another source of
external pressure for efficiency. Previous literature showed that HMO penetration is directly
associated with hospital efficiency [22]. Similar to Rosko and Mutter [5], we used percent of
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Medicare HMO penetration as a proxy for general HMO penetration. We also included in the
second stage model the median household income of the county (from the Area Resource
File) and a dummy variable for 2006 to control for time effects.
4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 DEA Efficiency Estimator (First Stage)
For the efficiency analysis of CAHs, we use a two-stage approach along the line of Simar and
Wilson [6]. In the first stage, a DEA efficiency estimator is used to obtain technical
efficiency scores for individual CAHs. The main advantage of DEA is that it can easily
accommodate multiple inputs and outputs and requires no specific assumption about the
functional form of the frontier.5 However, DEA is deterministic, meaning that deviations
from the efficient frontier are entirely assumed to be due to inefficiency and no allowance is
made for statistical noise.
Consistent with the statistical model defined by Simar and Wilson [6], we specify the
following production or technology set:
T = {( x, y ) ∈ R+N + M | x can produce y}

(1)

where x ∈ R+N is a vector of N inputs used to produce a vector of M outputs, y ∈ R+M . The
upper boundary of T, which represents the technology or production frontier, is of interest for
efficiency measurement. Inefficient hospitals operate at points in the interior of T, with the
distance from each point in T to the frontier representing inefficiency, while those that are
efficient operate on the frontier.
In this study, an input-oriented, variable returns to scale (VRS) approach to efficiency
measurement is used, based on the assumption that hospitals have more control over their
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inputs than over the outputs. The Farrell [7] input-oriented measure of technical efficiency
is:

θ ( x, y ) = inf {θ | (θx, y ) ∈ T }

(2)

which gives the radial, proportionate reduction in inputs for a hospital to become technically
efficient in the sense that (θx, y ) is on the efficient frontier. By construction,

0 < θ ( x, y ) ≤ 1 and a hospital is efficient if θ ( x, y ) = 1 .
In practice, T and θ ( x, y ) are unobserved and their estimates can be consistently
obtained from the observed data by employing a DEA efficiency estimator. Let yrj be a
vector of outputs (r = 1,…., M) and xij a vector of inputs (i = 1,…..., N) for each hospital j (j =
1,….., n). For a given level of outputs yro and a given level of inputs xio for hospital o, the
input-oriented measure of technical efficiency, assuming VRS, can be estimated by solving
the following DEA linear programming problem:

Minλ ,θ θ subject to :

∑
∑
∑

n
j =1
n
j =1
n
j =1

λ j yrj ≥ yro , (r = 1,...., M )
λ j xij ≤ θxio , (i = 1, ...., N )
(3)

λj = 1

λ j ≥ 0, ( j = 1,......, n)
where λj (j = 1, …., n) are the intensity variables over which optimization in (3) is made. The
objective of (3) is to find the minimum θ that proportionally reduces the input vector to

θxio while guaranteeing at least the output level yro . The optimal solution is θˆ ≤ 1 , where

θˆ = 1 indicates a point on the efficient frontier and, hence, a technically efficient hospital.

5

Alternatively, one can use a stochastic frontier model which, as a parametric approach, requires strong
assumptions about the functional form and error distributions. Further, a stochastic frontier model cannot easily
accommodate multiple outputs and inputs.
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θˆ < 1 indicates that it is possible to produce the observed level of outputs using
proportionately less than observed input levels of the hospital.
4.4.2 Truncated Regression (Second Stage)

Our focus in this study is generating valid inferences about the impact of environmental
variables on the technical efficiency of CAHs. For this, we follow Simar and Wilson [6] and
specify, at the second stage, the truncated regression model:6
0 < θˆi = z i β + ε i ≤ 1 i = 1, 2,…., n

(4)

where θˆi is the DEA estimated technical efficiency score of the i-th hospital, εi is assumed to
be normally distributed with left truncation at − zi β and right truncation at 1 − zi β , zi is a

vector of environmental variables which are thought to have an effect on hospital efficiency,
and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The implicit assumption is that the
environmental variables only affect the efficiency scores and have no effect on the frontier
[6]. Unfortunately, θˆi is biased and θˆi ’s and, implicitly, εi’s (i = 1, 2,…, n) in (4) are serially
correlated. While the correlation among εi’s disappears asymptotically, standard methods for
inference are invalid. To provide valid inference in the second stage analysis, Simar and
Wilson [6] suggest using a parametric bootstrap of the truncated regression in (4) which they
call Algorithm #1. This single bootstrap procedure (Algorithm #1) can improve on inference
in the second stage regression, but without correcting the DEA estimator for bias.
Alternatively, Simar and Wilson [6] suggest using a bootstrap procedure to obtain
bias-corrected DEA estimates of technical efficiency and use them as the dependent variable
in the second stage regression. This approach has been shown to improve the statistical

6

Many of the previous two-stage studies used a tobit (censored) regression in the second stage. However,
Simar and Wilson showed that tobit is a misspecification under their statistical model.
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efficiency of the parameter estimator in the second stage truncated regression [6]. The
truncated regression model can be rewritten as
ˆ
0 < θˆi = z i β + ε i ≤ 1

(5)

ˆ
where θˆi = θˆi − bias(θˆi ) is the bias-corrected estimator of technical efficiency and bias (θˆi ) is
the bootstrap bias estimate of θˆi . For valid inference about β, a second bootstrap procedure
must be applied to the truncated regression in (5). The specific steps of the double bootstrap
procedure used in this study follow from Algorithm #2 of Simar and Wilson [6], modified to
account for the left and right boundaries of input-oriented technical efficiency scores:
1. Using the original sample of data, estimate the input-oriented DEA technical
efficiency scores θˆi ’s (i = 1,…., n).
2. Obtain estimates βˆ in the truncated regression 0 < θˆi = zi β + ε i ≤ 1 using m<n
observations, when θˆi < 1 .
3. Loop over the next four steps (3.1 - 3.4) L1 = 100 times to obtain a set of bootstrap

{ }

estimates B = θˆib*
3.1.

L1

b =1

, i = 1, ….., n:

For each i = 1, ….., n draw εi from N (0, σˆ 2 ) with left truncation at − z i β̂ and
right truncation at 1 − z i β̂ .

3.2.

Compute θ i* = z i βˆ + ε i , i = 1, ….., n.

3.3.

Set xi* = xiθˆi / θ i* and y i* = y i , i = 1, ….., n.

3.4.

Using xi* and yi* , estimate θˆi* (i = 1,…., n) using the DEA estimator.

ˆ
4. For each i = 1, ….., n, compute the bias-corrected estimates θˆi using the bootstrap
estimates in B obtained in step 3.4 and the original estimates θˆi .
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ˆ
ˆ
5. Estimate the truncated regression of θˆi on zi to obtain estimates βˆ .
6. Loop over the next three steps (6.1 – 6.3) L2 = 2000 times to obtain a set of bootstrap
L

ˆ 2
estimates Δ = ⎧⎨βˆ * ⎫⎬ :
⎩ ⎭b=1
6.1.

ˆ
For each i = 1,…., n, draw εi from N (0, σˆˆ 2 ) with left truncation at − z i βˆ and
ˆ
right truncation at 1 − z i βˆ .

6.2.

ˆ
Compute θ i** = z i βˆ + ε i , i = 1,….., n.

6.3.

ˆ
Estimate the truncated regression of θ i** on zi, yielding estimates β̂ * .

ˆ
7. Use the bootstrap values in Δ and the original estimates βˆ to construct confidence
intervals for each element of β. The (1-α) confidence interval for βj is constructed by

ˆ
ˆ
finding values aα/2 and bα/2 such that Pr ⎡− bα* / 2 ≤ ( βˆ *j − βˆ j ) ≤ −aα* / 2 ⎤ ≈ 1 − α .
⎢⎣
⎥⎦
4.5 Results

In the first stage, DEA is used with the two years of data (2005 and 2006) jointly to estimate
technical efficiency scores of CAHs. This approach offers the advantage of a substantial
increase in the sample size which is important for obtaining reliable estimates of efficiency
used in the second stage regression [11]. In the second stage, we use a pooled cross-sectional
design for the truncated regression model.
4.5.1 Technical Efficiency Scores (First Stage)

Table 4.2 presents original and bias-corrected mean technical efficiency of CAHs. The
original (uncorrected) mean technical efficiency of CAHs estimated using DEA without
quality outputs was 0.84 and increased to 0.89 when quality outputs were included in the
DEA model. These results are consistent with Nayar and Ozcan [8] who found that the
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average technical efficiency of a sample of hospitals in Virginia increased from 0.81 to 0.86
after the inclusion of three quality measures for pneumonia (from CMS Hospital Compare) in
the DEA model. Alternatively, this increase in technical efficiency after controlling for
quality could be a consequence of the increased number of outputs in the DEA model.
Table 4.2. Original and bias-corrected efficiency scores.
DEA without Quality Outputs
DEA with Quality Outputs
Bias-Corrected
Bias-Corrected
Original DEA
Original DEA
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev.
Year
N
Estimates
Estimates
2005
186
0.826
0.707
0.113
0.871
0.750
0.097
2006
229
0.855
0.724
0.099
0.906
0.767
0.084
All
415
0.842
0.716
0.106
0.890
0.759
0.090
Note: Estimation of bias-corrected efficiency scores was based on the first stage of Algorithm #2 of Simar and
Wilson, modified for the left and right boundaries of input-oriented efficiency scores. Estimation by authors in
Matlab, adopting from code written by V. Zelenyuk and L. Simar.

We further investigated the sensitivity of technical efficiency scores with respect to
quality outputs using an approach suggested by Simar and Zelenyuk [23]. Specifically, a
nonparametric kernel density estimator was used to estimate the densities of efficiency scores
from the two DEA models in which quality outputs were included and excluded. The null
hypothesis on equality between these densities was tested using a bootstrap-based test (see
Simar and Zelenyuk [23] for details). Simar-Zelenyuk test rejected the null hypothesis of
equal densities (Simar-Zelenyuk test = 3.26, bootstrap p-value = 0.003), suggesting that
quality has a statistically significant effect on CAHs’ technical efficiency.
The results in Table 4.2 also indicate that the bias-corrected efficiency scores are, on
average, lower than the uncorrected DEA estimates suggesting that the uncorrected efficiency
estimates are upward biased. Specifically, the mean of bias-corrected efficiency scores was
0.76 in the DEA model with quality outputs suggesting that, without correcting for bias, the
estimated results would have indicated that CAHs were performing more technically efficient
than they actually were.
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4.5.2 Truncated Regression Results (Second Stage)

The focus of this study is on using the two-stage approach with bootstrap procedures
suggested by Simar and Wilson [6] to make valid inferences about the effects of
environmental variables on CAHs’ technical efficiency. The dependent variable in the
second stage truncated regression is hospital technical efficiency; therefore, a positive
(negative) coefficient indicates a positive (negative) marginal effect on efficiency. Table 4.3
summarizes the results of three bootstrapped truncated regression models (see Tables A.4.4,
A.4.5, and A.4.6 in Appendix 3 for percentile bootstrap confidence intervals of the truncated
regression coefficients).
Model 1 in Table 4.3 was based on Algorithm #2 where bias-corrected efficiency
scores, estimated in the first stage DEA model with no quality outputs, were used in the
second stage bootstrapped truncated regression. The results of Model 1 show that the
coefficients of most environmental variables are insignificant (only system membership has a
positive and significant coefficient, as expected). Model 2, in which quality outputs were
included in the DEA model, was based on Algorithm #1 where original (uncorrected)
technical efficiency scores were regressed on environmental variables in the second stage
bootstrapped truncated regression. The results show that Model 2 is also characterized by
low statistical significance (only HHI was found significant in Model 2). Model 3 was based
on Algorithm #2 in which bias-corrected technical efficiency scores obtained in the first stage
DEA model with quality outputs were regressed, in the second stage, on environmental
variables. Relative to Model 1, the results of Model 3 show a clear improvement in the
statistical significance of the estimated coefficients when quality is accounted for in
efficiency estimation. Similarly, Model 3 shows a clear improvement in statistical efficiency
relative to Model 2. This is consistent with Simar and Wilson [6] findings that Algorithm #2
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improves statistical efficiency in the second stage truncated regression more than Algorithm
#1.
Table 4.3. Results of the second stage bootstrapped truncated regressions.
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Constant
0.7232***
0.7885***
0.7124***
Government
-0.0157
-0.0245
-0.0214**
For-profit
0.0148
-0.0132
-0.0166
Medicare
0.0001
0.0012
0.0007
Medicaid
0.0013
0.0029
0.0016**
HHI
0.0031
-0.0691**
-0.0514***
System
0.0388***
0.0364
0.0381***
Income
-1.37E-06
-2.94E-07
-3.34E-07
MHMO
-0.0007
0.0026
0.0017**
Y2006
0.0236**
0.0084
0.0171*
Sigma
0.1033***
0.1400***
0.0851***
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on percentile bootstrap confidence
intervals. Model 1 is based on Algorithm #2 using no quality outputs in DEA model; Model 2 is based on
Algorithm #1 using quality outputs in DEA model; Models 3 is based on Algorithm #2 using quality outputs in
DEA model. Estimation by authors in STATA 11 with 2000 bootstrap replications for confidence intervals of
the estimated coefficients.

Now, we refer to Model 3 (the benchmark) for the interpretation of the coefficients.
The key variables are the two proxies for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. It is
widely recognized that hospitals respond to the Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement
mechanism. For example, previous studies showed that Medicare PPS placed fiscal pressure
on hospitals and Medicare percent of admissions was directly related with hospital efficiency
[19]. Medicare cost-based reimbursement, on the other hand, was associated with
inefficiency in hospital operations. In this study, we test the effect of Medicare percent of
admissions (a proxy for Medicare reimbursement) on the technical efficiency of CAHs. The
estimated results show that Medicare percent of admissions has a positive but insignificant
coefficient, potentially suggesting that Medicare cost-based reimbursement may not have had
detrimental effects on CAHs’ technical efficiency, after controlling for quality. The results
may also suggest that CAHs did not intentionally over-consume hospital inputs in order to
maximize reimbursement, but rather increased reimbursement revenues would have been
driven primarily by the increased reimbursement rate. Additionally, Medicaid percent of
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admissions has a positive and significant effect on the technical efficiency of CAHs. This is
consistent with prior research which has shown that Medicaid typically underpays hospitals
and exerts cost containment pressures irrespective of the payment mechanism [19].
The estimated results show a negative and significant coefficient of government
ownership, suggesting that government owned CAHs are less technically efficient relative to
non-profit CAHs, a result consistent with previous literature [5]. We found an insignificant
effect of for-profit ownership on technical efficiency, suggesting that for-profit CAHs are no
more technically efficient than non-profit CAHs.
The results also show that Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) has a negative and
significant coefficient, suggesting that an increase in HHI (or a decrease in hospital market
competition) leads to a decrease in CAHs’ technical efficiency. This result is consistent with
other findings in the literature [5] and with the concept of price-based competition which
suggests that if competition is increased, hospitals will compete for patients by reducing costs
[19]. This result may also indicate that there may be some hospitals that are not critical for
access that have been given the benefits of the CAH status.7 MedPAC [1] estimated that 16
percent of CAHs are less than 15 miles from another hospital and only 17 percent of CAHs
are more than 35 miles from another provider, raising issues of competition between some
CAHs and nearby non-converting hospitals.
The positive and significant coefficient of system membership suggests that CAHs
that are members of a multi-hospital system are more technically efficient than the ones that
are not, a result consistent with previous literature [5]. Similarly, the positive and significant
coefficient of Medicare HMO may suggest that Medicare HMO penetration creates pressure
for CAHs to operate more efficiently [5]. This is also consistent with other studies that found
a direct correlation between managed care penetration and hospital efficiency [22].
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4.6 Conclusions

This paper examined technical efficiency of Critical Access Hospitals using recent
methodological advancements in efficiency analysis and incorporating measures of quality.
Specifically, we used a two-stage DEA approach with Algorithm #1 and Algorithm #2
bootstrap procedures proposed by Simar and Wilson [6] for making valid inferences about
the effects of environmental variables on CAHs’ technical efficiency. An important finding
was that the performance of the double bootstrap procedure (Algorithm #2) in explaining
hospital efficiency significantly improved when quality was accounted for in efficiency
estimation relative to a similar model without quality. Similarly, we also compared the
performance of Algorithm #2 with that of the single bootstrap procedure (Algorithm #1).
While both bootstrap algorithms were created to provide valid inference, Algorithm #2
clearly improved statistical efficiency in the second stage truncated regression relative to
Algorithm #1.
As a result, our preferred model for estimating the (marginal) effects of environmental
variables on the technical efficiency of CAHs was based on the two-stage approach with
Algorithm #2 proposed by Simar and Wilson [6]. Specifically, bias-corrected technical
efficiency scores, obtained using a bootstrapped DEA model with quality outputs, were
regressed on environmental variables using a bootstrapped truncated regression. The key
finding was that Medicare percent of admissions variable had an insignificant effect on
CAHs’ technical efficiency, suggesting that Medicare cost-based reimbursement may not
have created a disincentive for these hospitals to operate in a less technically efficient
manner. The percent of Medicaid admissions had a positive and significant effect on the

7

We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue.
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technical efficiency of CAHs, consistent with prior studies showing Medicaid’s positive
effect on hospital efficiency.
A limitation of this research is associated with incomplete information on many of
the quality measures reported by CAHs to Hospital Compare. As a result, only quality
measures for pneumonia were selected for this study [8], and the two years of data were
jointly used in the analysis to increase the sample size. As new data become available, future
research on CAH efficiency should incorporate other quality controls in the methodological
advancements proposed by Simar and Wilson [6].
Although the two-stage approach has been very popular in the efficiency analysis
literature, Simar and Wilson [6] criticized previous applications of this method because of the
failure to define a statistical model consistent with the second stage analysis. They show that
the DEA efficiency estimates used in the second stage are biased and serially correlated, and,
thus, standard methods for inference are invalid. Consequently, the bootstrap methods
proposed by Simar and Wilson [6] are the only feasible means for making valid inference in
the second stage regression. Our research suggests that, for future hospital efficiency studies,
the two-stage DEA approach with double bootstrap can be a viable alternative for analyzing
the effects of environmental variables on hospital efficiency.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Summary and Conclusions
With health care costs rising at a rapid rate, cost containment is one of the most important issues
in the present health care debate. One approach to address rising health care costs is to improve
the efficiency of health care providers. In this dissertation, I examine the efficiency of rural
hospitals in the U.S. with a focus on the Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Program. This research
is particularly important as Congress weights the tradeoff of increased Medicare costs versus
rural health care access.
Rural hospitals have played a critical role for access to health care services in rural
communities. Their low-volume of patients, however, makes costs per unit of service
disproportionately large and puts rural hospitals (especially small ones) at risk of closure.
The CAH Program has been created to maintain access to health care services in isolated
communities by improving the financial viability of small hospitals and preventing closure.
CAHs receive Medicare cost-based reimbursement, where hospitals’ payments must equal
hospitals’ charges. Cost-based reimbursement, however, has been associated with increased
health care costs and inefficiency.
Under the Prospective Payment System (PPS), hospitals are paid fixed prices based on
the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) and are allowed to keep the difference between these fixed
prices and their costs. Thus, the PPS provides incentives for hospitals to reduce costs and
increase efficiency by motivating hospitals to keep their unit costs below the PPS reimbursement
rates in order to make profits. Although there is a large consensus that the CAH Program has
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improved access to health care services in isolated rural communities, concerns have been raised
about the efficiency of CAHs.
The objective of Chapter 2 was to analyze the impact of conversion to CAH status on
hospital efficiency. The efficiency scores of a sample of rural hospitals before and after the
conversion to CAH status, as well as of a comparison group of non-converting, PPS rural
hospitals were estimated and compared. Additionally, overall hospital cost efficiency was
decomposed into its allocative and technical components. This allowed me to infer whether the
failure to achieve cost efficiency might be due to (a) technical inefficiency in the sense that
hospitals do not use minimum quantities of inputs to produce their outputs, or (b) allocative
inefficiency in the sense that hospitals do not use the least cost combination of inputs in
producing outputs. A two-stage approach was used, where Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
was used in the first stage to estimate cost, technical, and allocative efficiency scores of each
hospital in the sample. The densities of efficiency scores of CAHs and PPS rural hospitals were
estimated and compared using a nonparametric kernel density estimator and a bootstrap-based
test. In the second stage, a truncated regression with bootstrap was used to investigate the effects
of environmental variables on efficiency scores.
The density analysis of efficiency scores showed that CAHs were less cost and
allocativelly efficient than the comparison group of non-converting rural hospitals, while they
were no less technically efficient. When compared with their pre-conversion selves, CAHs
appeared to be slightly less allocativelly efficient, while they were slightly more technically
efficient and no less cost efficient. Bootstrapped truncated regression results showed that CAHs
tended to be less cost and allocatively efficient than PPS rural hospitals, while they were no less
technically efficient.
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The objective of Chapter 3 was to analyze the impact of different Medicare
reimbursement systems on the cost efficiency of rural hospitals. Specifically, I statistically test
whether there are cost efficiency differences between cost-based reimbursed CAHs and rural
hospitals paid under the PPS reimbursement system. The analysis controlled for the quality of
care as well as compared different models of efficiency analysis. Cost efficiency scores were
estimated using two different frontier methods: DEA and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). The
comparison of mean cost efficiencies between cost-based reimbursed CAHs and PPS rural
hospitals showed that CAHs were less cost efficient than the PPS rural hospitals. The density
analysis of DEA cost efficiency scores also showed that CAHs were less cost efficient than the
PPS rural hospitals, and the difference was statistically significant. Additionally, marginal
effects of environmental variables were estimated using SFA and the two-stage DEA approach
with tobit as well as with the bootstrapped truncated regression. The CAH dummy, the key
variable in this study, had a statistically significant coefficient in the bootstrapped truncated
regression and SFA models, suggesting that CAHs were less cost efficient than the PPS rural
hospitals.
To the best of my knowledge, Chapter 4 provides the first application of the two-stage
approach with double bootstrap to analyze efficiency in the U.S. hospital industry. Specifically,
bias-corrected efficiency scores obtained in the first stage using a specific bootstrap procedure
are regressed on environmental variables, in the second stage, using a bootstrapped truncated
regression. An important finding was that the performance of the double bootstrap procedure in
explaining hospital efficiency significantly improved when quality was accounted for in
efficiency estimation relative to a similar model without quality. Additionally, the double
bootstrap procedure clearly improved on statistical efficiency of parameter estimates in the
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second stage truncated regression relative to the single bootstrap procedure (where original
efficiency scores were used in the second stage bootstrapped truncated regression).
The objective of Chapter 4 was also to examine the relationship between Medicare costbased reimbursement and the technical efficiency of CAHs. Medicare cost-based reimbursement
has been the primary factor driving CAH conversion. Cost-based reimbursement, however, has
been historically associated with hospital inefficiency. Thus, the question that arises is: does
Medicare cost-based reimbursement have a negative effect on CAHs’ technical efficiency.
Overall, the estimated results suggest that enhanced Medicare reimbursement may not have had
detrimental effects on the technical efficiency of CAHs.
5.2 Policy Implications
The results of this dissertation have important implications for policy. First, the results indicate
that the technical efficiency of rural hospitals that converted to CAH status improved relative to
the pre-conversion period. At the same time, CAHs appear to be as technically efficient as nonconverting, PPS rural hospitals. It may be the case that the CAH Program’s requirements
(limitations on the maximum number of acute care beds to 25 and average length of stay to 4
days) may have resulted in technical efficiency improvements comparable to the PPS. For
example, these requirements may have limited the types and complexity of procedures treated by
CAHs. The relatively larger proportion of less complex procedures with low resource
requirements may have created the increase in CAHs’ technical efficiency.
Second, the results also indicate that CAHs are less allocatively efficient not only relative
to the pre-conversion period, but also relative to non-converting, PPS rural hospitals. CAH
conversion has been primarily associated with Medicare cost-based reimbursement which has
dramatically changed hospitals’ financial incentives. Stensland, Davidson, and Moscovice [1]
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found that hospitals that converted to CAH status significantly increased their Medicare revenue,
profitability, employee salaries and capital expenditures. Schoenman and Sutton [2] found that,
after conversion to CAH status, hospitals increased their profitability due to Medicare cost-based
reimbursement. Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that after hospitals improved their finances
post-conversion, many CAHs invested in new equipment, new hospitals or major infrastructure
upgrades. It may be the case that the allocative inefficiency increase for CAH hospitals may be
due to their inability to substitute to lower cost inputs in the production process.
Third, the overall cost efficiency of cost-based reimbursed CAHs was, on average,
between 4.5 and 6.7 percent lower (depending on the model choice) than that of non-converting,
PPS rural hospitals. To see the impact of Medicare cost-based reimbursement on the costs of
CAHs, I multiply mean CAH expenditure ($16,700,000 in 2005 dollars) by the difference in cost
efficiency between CAHs and PPS rural hospitals. I found that the cost per CAH was, on
average, between $751,500 and $1,119,000 higher than the cost that would have been under the
PPS reimbursement. For a total number of 1,055 CAHs in 2005, I estimate the cost of the CAH
Program to have been between $793,000,000 and almost $1.2 billion higher than it would have
been under the PPS. Given that the CAH Program has been created to increase Medicare
payments to low-volume hospitals whose Medicare costs exceed the PPS rates, this increase in
spending might be justified if hospital closure and its negative impact have been avoided.
While efficiency is an important factor for measuring the effectiveness of a health care
policy or program, a complete assessment of the CAH program needs to go beyond efficiency
and take into account issues such as equitable access to high-quality care. The policy rationale
for the Medicare cost-based reimbursement of CAH hospitals has been to protect these small,
financially vulnerable rural hospitals and prevent their potential closure. The benefits of the
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CAH Program have been mostly associated with improvements in access to health care services
in isolated rural areas. Previous literature also showed that retaining a limited hospital facility in
a rural community not only reduces welfare losses relative to the hospital closure [3], but also
has a positive economic impact on the community as a whole [4]. Holmes et al. [4] estimated
that the closure of the sole hospital in the community reduced per-capita income by 4 percent and
increased the unemployment rate by 1.6 percent. The cost of the CAH Program is represented by
the increased Medicare payments for CAH hospitals which are borne in principal by federal
taxpayers. While a complete evaluation of the CAH program requires answering the question
whether the total benefits outweigh the total costs, this research attempts to add to the policy
debate by understanding if, and by how much, efficiency declines occurred for hospitals that
converted to CAH status.
5.3 Limitations and Future Research
A particular challenge in this research was controlling for the quality of care. While controlling
for quality is important in hospital efficiency and cost studies, finding adequate measures of
quality has been difficult. The problem is that quality of care has many dimensions, and no single
measure will be capable of capturing it. Since 2004, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) Hospital Compare database has provided some quality measures but, unfortunately, the
proportion of CAH hospitals reporting quality information has been very small. CAH hospitals
voluntarily report quality information to CMS and they do not have the financial incentives of
PPS hospitals to consistently report such information. While the approach taken to study the
impact of CAH conversion on hospital efficiency in Chapter 2 made it impossible to find quality
measures for the two years before conversion (1997 and 1998), I was able to control for quality
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in the other two essays using quality measures for pneumonia. As new data become available,
future research on CAH efficiency should include additional quality controls.
While there is a growing literature on the cost side of the CAH Program, I am unaware of
any attempt to estimate the welfare benefits of the CAH Program. These benefits have been
mostly associated with improvements in access to health care services in isolated rural areas.
Thus, future research should provide an estimate of the value of access to a CAH hospital or the
value of preventing closure. Further, future research should evaluate the potential impact of
alternative reimbursement mechanisms, such as modified PPS, to increase the efficiency of CAH
hospitals without deteriorating financial viability and quality of care of these hospitals.
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APPENDIX 1
ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 2

Figure A.2.1. Densities of inefficiency scores for all hospitals in the sample, before trimming of
outliers.
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Table A.2.5. Bootstrap estimated confidence intervals: cost inefficiency.
99% Bootstrap C.I.
Variable
CAH
Government
For-profit
Medicare
Medicaid
HHI
System
Income
MHMO
Emergency
Surgeries
Births
2006
2005
1998
Constant

β

95% Bootstrap C.I.

90% Bootstrap C.I.

LB

UB

LB

UB

LB

UB

0.3987
0.2028
-0.1453
0.0043
-0.0058
0.0171
-0.1535
-0.000006
-0.0054
-0.0006
-0.0035
-0.0076
-0.2987
-0.3417

0.3129
0.1489
-0.2574
0.0018
-0.0096
-0.0556
-0.2150
-0.000011
-0.0100
-0.0022
-0.0139
-0.0111
-0.4118
-0.4499

0.4875
0.2552
-0.0282
0.0068
-0.0020
0.0855
-0.0910
-0.000001
-0.0004
0.0008
0.0064
-0.0040
-0.1941
-0.2331

0.3308
0.1618
-0.2346
0.0025
-0.0087
-0.0397
-0.2019
-0.000010
-0.0089
-0.0017
-0.0113
-0.0102
-0.3840
-0.4219

0.4675
0.2440
-0.0541
0.0062
-0.0028
0.0736
-0.1055
-0.000003
-0.0016
0.0006
0.0040
-0.0047
-0.2136
-0.2621

0.3419
0.1684
-0.2176
0.0027
-0.0083
-0.0310
-0.1938
-0.000009
-0.0084
-0.0015
-0.0100
-0.0098
-0.3666
-0.4094

0.4554
0.2380
-0.0656
0.0059
-0.0033
0.0644
-0.1138
-0.000003
-0.0021
0.0004
0.0028
-0.0052
-0.2277
-0.2747

-0.0165
2.3273

-0.0914
2.0709

0.0572
2.5907

-0.0701
2.1343

0.0388
2.5148

-0.0635
2.1609

0.0290
2.4867
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Table A.2.6. Bootstrap estimated confidence intervals: technical inefficiency.
99% Bootstrap C.I.
Variable
CAH
Government
For-profit
Medicare
Medicaid
HHI
System
Income
MHMO
Emergency
Surgeries
Births
2006
2005
1998
Constant

β

95% Bootstrap C.I.

90% Bootstrap C.I.

LB

UB

LB

UB

LB

UB

0.0217
0.1374
0.0501
0.0034
-0.0053
0.0806
-0.0935
-0.000005
-0.0059
0.0005
-0.0043
-0.0011
-0.0749
-0.1209

-0.0524
0.0916
-0.0406
0.0015
-0.0085
0.0184
-0.1460
-0.000008
-0.0100
-0.0006
-0.0124
-0.0042
-0.1533
-0.1987

0.0933
0.1814
0.1523
0.0054
-0.0021
0.1430
-0.0426
-0.000001
-0.0016
0.0018
0.0038
0.0018
0.0087
-0.0457

-0.0332
0.1029
-0.0194
0.0020
-0.0077
0.0345
-0.1331
-0.000008
-0.0091
-0.0004
-0.0107
-0.0034
-0.1351
-0.1812

0.0737
0.1720
0.1206
0.0049
-0.0029
0.1273
-0.0557
-0.000002
-0.0028
0.0014
0.0016
0.0011
-0.0091
-0.0611

-0.0253
0.1084
-0.0073
0.0022
-0.0073
0.0424
-0.1253
-0.000007
-0.0084
-0.0002
-0.0096
-0.0030
-0.1271
-0.1698

0.0671
0.1670
0.1101
0.0046
-0.0034
0.1193
-0.0624
-0.000002
-0.0032
0.0013
0.0006
0.0008
-0.0183
-0.0683

-0.0184
1.5242

-0.0789
1.3031

0.0418
1.7344

-0.0645
1.3701

0.0273
1.6828

-0.0561
1.3985

0.0203
1.6601
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Table A.2.7. Bootstrap estimated confidence intervals: allocative inefficiency.
99% Bootstrap C.I.
Variable
CAH
Government
For-profit
Medicare
Medicaid
HHI
System
Income
MHMO
Emergency
Surgeries
Births
2006
2005
1998
Constant

β

95% Bootstrap C.I.

90% Bootstrap C.I.

LB

UB

LB

UB

LB

UB

0.5482
0.0746
-0.2948
0.0007
-0.00003
-0.0731
-0.0524
0.000001
0.0014
-0.0010
-0.0019
-0.0085
-0.4124
-0.3980

0.4350
0.0242
-0.4152
-0.0016
-0.0035
-0.1427
-0.1034
-0.000003
-0.0026
-0.0023
-0.0116
-0.0121
-0.5244
-0.5033

0.6456
0.1252
-0.1548
0.0027
0.0033
-0.0069
0.0010
0.000005
0.0059
0.0003
0.0076
-0.0051
-0.2935
-0.2803

0.4642
0.0371
-0.3939
-0.0009
-0.0027
-0.1207
-0.0930
-0.000002
-0.0017
-0.0020
-0.0092
-0.0111
-0.5009
-0.4812

0.6271
0.1121
-0.1904
0.0022
0.0026
-0.0225
-0.0097
0.000004
0.0048
0.00000
0.0053
-0.0058
-0.3226
-0.3110

0.4807
0.0432
-0.3811
-0.0006
-0.0023
-0.1136
-0.0861
-0.000002
-0.0013
-0.0019
-0.0079
-0.0106
-0.4846
-0.4700

0.6156
0.1066
-0.2078
0.0020
0.0022
-0.0335
-0.0178
0.000004
0.0043
-0.0002
0.0041
-0.0063
-0.3380
-0.3249

-0.0136

-0.0794

0.0529

-0.0612

0.0375

-0.0538

0.0285

1.2826

1.0652

1.5117

1.1097

1.4447

1.1386

1.4231
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Table A.2.8. Results of bootstrapped truncated regressions: pooled data with 2005 and 2006.
Variable

Cost
Inefficiency

Technical
Inefficiency

CAH
0.3183***
Government
0.2105***
For-profit
-0.2013***
Medicare
0.0014
Medicaid
-0.0079***
HHI
-0.0244
System
-0.1661***
Income
-2.51E-06
MHMO
-0.0097***
Emergency
-0.0013
Surgeries
-0.0064
Birth
-0.0163***
2006
0.0381
Constant
2.0298***
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
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-0.0038
0.1673***
-0.0917*
0.0021**
-0.0070***
0.0399
-0.0526**
-3.62E-06*
-0.0091***
0.0008
-0.0081*
-0.0025
0.0453**
1.4975***

Allocative
Inefficiency
0.6619***
0.0672**
-0.3023**
-0.0009
-0.0004
-0.0861**
-0.1485***
5.03E-06*
-0.0001
-0.0030***
0.0005
-0.0226***
-0.0273
0.6573***

APPENDIX 2
ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 3
For the specification of the SFA cost model, I performed a series of likelihood ratio tests. First, I
tested whether SFA is more appropriate than OLS regression as an estimation technique. The
null hypothesis that the two approaches were equivalent was rejected at the 5% level of
significance and the stochastic frontier cost model was used in empirical analysis. In SFA, an
assumption about the distribution of the inefficiency error term, u, must be made. One of the
concerns about SFA has been that it does not provide a prior justification for the choice of a
distribution for u. This problem has been partially addressed by using the truncated-normal
distribution which is a generalization of the half-normal distribution. The truncated-normal
distribution for u, defined as u ~ N+ (µ, σ u2 ), reduces to the half-normal distribution when µ=0.
A likelihood ratio test for H0: µ=0 failed to reject the null hypothesis and the half-normal
distribution was assumed in empirical estimation. I also tested whether a simpler functional
form such as Cobb-Douglas could more accurately represent the cost frontier. The null
hypothesis was that the parameters of all squared and interaction terms in the translog cost
function were equal to zero. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the translog
functional form is more appropriate. Finally, Hausman tests for endogeneity suggest that the
price of capital and hospital outputs can be treated as being exogenous.
The results of the SFA translog cost function (Table A.3.6) show that the coefficient of
the price of capital, pk, was found positive and significant, as expected. Some of the estimated
coefficients of the output variables and interaction terms were insignificant or of an unexpected
sign, fact that may be due to multicolinearity problems. I also found positive and significant
coefficients for the product mix descriptors (erv%, outsurg%, and birth%). Of the two quality
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control variables, only pneum_vac% was found positive and significant, indicating a direct
relationship between quality and hospital costs.
Table A.3.6. Results of the SFA translog cost estimation
Variable

Coeff.

t-stat

2.8369
-0.5573
0.3269
-0.0083
0.7944
-0.0428
-0.0324
0.1381
0.0472
-0.0378
-0.0402
0.1044
-0.0307

1.4964
-1.4388
1.4184
-0.0344
3.9365
-0.7137
-1.4357
4.4076
1.5082
-2.2163
-1.5293
5.4357
-1.1256

0.0403

2.3325

-0.0639

-4.1126

ln(bdtot)

0.1810

4.3104

erv%

0.0027

4.2204

outsurg%

0.0171

5.8217

birth%

0.0048

4.9587

pneum_vac%

0.0007

2.1861

initial_antib%

-0.0002

-0.1976

Y2006

-0.0894

-1.5021

Constant
ln(admtot)
ln(postdays)
ln(opv)
ln(pk)
ln(admtot)-sq
ln(admtot)*ln(postdays)
ln(admtot)*ln(opv)
ln(postdays)-sq
ln(postdays)*ln(opv)
ln(opv)-sq
ln(pk)-sq
ln(admtot)*ln(pk)
ln(postdays)*ln(pk)
ln(opv)*ln(pk)

Log-Likelihood

147.0242
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APPENDIX 3
ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 4
Table A.4.4. Bootstrapped truncated regression: Model 1.

Variable
Constant
Government
For-profit
Medicare
Medicaid
HHI
System
Income
MHMO
Y2006
Sigma

β
0.7232
-0.0157
0.0148
0.0001
0.0013
0.0031
0.0388
-1.37E-06
-0.0007
0.0236
0.1033

99% Bootstrap C.I.
LB
UB
0.5699
0.8846
-0.0459
0.0136
-0.0635
0.0918
-0.0013
0.0014
-0.0009
0.0033
-0.0388
0.0413
0.0113
0.0690
-3.78E-06
9.60E-07
-0.0032
0.0020
-0.0060
0.0518
0.0944
0.1148

95% Bootstrap C.I.
LB
UB
0.6055
0.8433
-0.0383
0.0069
-0.0446
0.0715
-0.0009
0.0011
-0.0004
0.0029
-0.0277
0.0324
0.0177
0.0612
-3.21E-06
4.40E-07
-0.0026
0.0013
0.0023
0.0444
0.0970
0.1119

90% Bootstrap C.I.
LB
UB
0.6261
0.8244
-0.0351
0.0039
-0.0331
0.0617
-0.0008
0.0010
-0.0002
0.0026
-0.0226
0.0271
0.0213
0.0577
-2.89E-06
1.50E-07
-0.0023
0.0009
0.0050
0.0411
0.0982
0.1108

Table A.4.5. Bootstrapped truncated regression: Model 2.

Variable
Constant
Government
For-profit
Medicare
Medicaid
HHI
System
Income
MHMO
Y2006
Sigma

β
0.7885
-0.0245
-0.0132
0.0012
0.0029
-0.0691
0.0364
-2.94E-07
0.0026
0.0084
0.1400

99% Bootstrap C.I.
LB
UB
0.4078
1.1230
-0.0825
0.0349
-0.2256
0.1454
-0.0019
0.0043
-0.0027
0.0079
-0.1517
0.0243
-0.0348
0.1018
-5.57E-06
5.25E-06
-0.0053
0.0088
-0.0530
0.0694
0.1096
0.1684
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95% Bootstrap C.I.
LB
UB
0.4909
1.0721
-0.0709
0.0227
-0.1720
0.1116
-0.0012
0.0037
-0.0012
0.0068
-0.1332
-0.0035
-0.0171
0.0839
-4.40E-06
3.77E-06
-0.0029
0.0071
-0.0395
0.0566
0.1219
0.1627

90% Bootstrap C.I.
LB
UB
0.5465
1.0333
-0.0636
0.0149
-0.1395
0.0864
-0.0008
0.0033
-0.0007
0.0062
-0.1258
-0.0155
-0.0080
0.0769
-3.79E-06
3.22E-06
-0.0018
0.0065
-0.0312
0.0464
0.1253
0.1600

Table A.4.6. Bootstrapped truncated regression: Model 3.

Variable
Constant
Government
For-profit
Medicare
Medicaid
HHI
System
Income
MHMO
Y2006
Sigma

β
0.7124
-0.0214
-0.0166
0.0007
0.0016
-0.0514
0.0381
-3.34E-07
0.0017
0.0171
0.0851

99% Bootstrap C.I.
LB
UB
0.5860
0.8449
-0.0462
0.0028
-0.0804
0.0453
-0.0005
0.0017
-0.0001
0.0033
-0.0857
-0.0200
0.0154
0.0632
-2.32E-06
1.57E-06
-0.0004
0.0039
-0.0072
0.0402
0.0779
0.0945
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95% Bootstrap C.I.
LB
UB
0.6167
0.8114
-0.0400
-0.0028
-0.0642
0.0299
-0.0002
0.0015
0.0003
0.0030
-0.0764
-0.0271
0.0208
0.0565
-1.84E-06
1.16E-06
0.00003
0.0033
-0.0005
0.0342
0.0800
0.0922

90% Bootstrap C.I.
LB
UB
0.6322
0.7955
-0.0373
-0.0053
-0.0553
0.0221
-0.00003
0.0014
0.0005
0.0027
-0.0727
-0.0316
0.0238
0.0538
-1.59E-06
9.22E-07
0.0003
0.0030
0.0018
0.0316
0.0811
0.0913
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